




**A STUDY OF INEQUITY IN
RELATION TO CERTAIN SOCIAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES**

ABSTRACT

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
Psychology

BY
Miss Ranjana Mittra



Under the Supervision of
Dr. Mashkoor A. Syed
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH
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ABSTRACT

Adams theory of equity (1963,a) has implications for the effect of amount of wages on workers productivity.

According to this theory, the employment relationship is a case of an exchange between an employer and employee. The employee exchanges his services for pay from the employer,

The theory predicts that, the worker strives to attain an equitable relationship between their job inputs and outcomes and those of a comparison 'other'. If a worker believes that he is overpaid/underpaid relative to 'other' with the same inputs, the theory predicts, that he will experience feelings of inequity and tension which he will try to reduce. The way a person reduces the feeling of inequity and tension may vary from person to person and for a particular person over time.

Recent investigators have studied inequity or equity and different factors related to it by using the allocation of reward method. The purpose of the present investigation is to verify the effects of socio-economic level, level of emotional adjustment, and level of anxiety on the equal or equitable distribution of rewards by co-workers in a triad.

The subjects used in the present investigation are female undergraduate students of Women's College, A.M.U., Aligarh, with an average age of 18.5 yrs. The socio-economic scale (Jalota, et al., 1970), the Aligarh Adjustment Inventory, and the Sinha W-A Self-Analysis Form (Anxiety Scale) were jointly administered to each of 430 female undergraduates comprising the population of the study. The sample of the study was 80 female subjects, each in herself, combining the three characteristics of socio-economic level (high - low), emotional adjustment (high - low); and level of anxiety (high - low). This lead to the formation of eight groups, each having 10 subjects. To form the triads, the 80 subject were randomly chosen and assigned a time to appear together for the experiment.

The experiment consisted of the setting-up of a group reaction time apparatus on which the triads worked together. They were told that the experiment simulated conditions found in industry and business where people worked together and earned a monetary reward. In the course of the experiment, one subject received 80% successful feedback, the second 50% successful feedback, and the third 30% successful feedback, irrespective of their actual performance. This situation was manipulated by the experimenter in accordance with the pre-planned objective of the experiment.

After the experiment each subject reported separately to the experimenter and were given the form where they had noted

the contributions of their partner's and themselves. They were told that as a group they have earned Rs.6/- . The subjects were then provided with a printed form listing all possible divisions of group earnings and asked to () mark the division, in the space provided, which they thought most appropriate for each member of the triad, in terms of their group contributions.

After they had chosen a division, a 5 item questionnaire was administered to the subjects. Responses to this questionnaire help the investigator in identifying the method used by the subjects which help in reducing the feelings of inequity generated by the use of their particular norm of distribution. As the study has three independent variables, each varied in two ways, a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial design was applied. The scores of the questionnaire were, thus, treated to the analysis of variance or F test for interpretation of data.

The results of the present investigation show that, while allocating rewards, irrespective of their inputs or performance, their socio-economic status (SEL), level of emotional adjustment (EA), or level of anxiety (AI), 36.25% of the subjects followed the equity norm, whereas, 68.75% of subjects followed the equality norm of distribution.

When the quality of performance of the subjects is considered, the results show, that majority of subjects with 30%

and 80% level of performance, divided the reward equally, whereas, majority of subjects with 50% level of performance preferred to follow the equity norms of reward distribution.

The results of the different combinations of levels of SEL, EA, and AI (high - low), show their effect, in giving tremendous shift to the basis of reward allocation on the part of the subjects. The subjects having LSEL - LEA - HA divided the reward on the basis of equality norm in 100% of cases, whereas, subjects having HSEL - HEA - LA divided the reward on the basis of equity norm in 100% of cases.

The application of the F test on the scores of the questionnaire showed the values of three items (Eos. II, III, IV) out of the 5 items being significant on the variable of emotional adjustment. The application of the t test lead to the conclusion that out of the two levels of emotional adjustment (HEA-LEA), the subjects with low emotional adjustment, who, while dividing the reward engaged in cognitive distortion to reduce the feeling of inequity created by their failure to follow the equity norm. Thus, taking less reward for themselves if their performance was superior or taking more reward for themselves if their performance was inferior because they followed the equality norm.



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
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ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
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
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30 March, 1980

Certified that Miss Ranjana Mittra has worked for her Ph.D. thesis on 'A Study of Inequity in relation to Certain Social, Psychological and Personality variables' under my supervision as a regular student of this University and has completed the prescribed period. I am satisfied that her work is upto the standard, and recommend that Miss Ranjana Mittra be allowed to supplicate for the degree of Ph.D. in Psychology of the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.


(Mashkoor Ahmad Syed)
Reader in Psychology
Supervisor

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

I wish to express my sincere and earnest thanks to my teacher and supervisor, Dr. Mashkoor A. Syed, Reader, in the Department of Psychology, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, whose valuable guidance was available to guide and inspire me at every stage of this investigation. His deep, critical understanding of the problem helped me in completing this thesis.

I am highly indebted to my eminent teacher, the late Professor Anwar Ansari, Head of the Department of Psychology, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, and the present Head of the Department of Psychology, Professor A. Jamil Qadri, for all his help and encouragement and for providing all the facilities to complete this work.

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I must also express my thanks to all the students, for their co-operation, which helped me in collecting my data.

Ranjana Mittra
RANJANA MITTRA

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE STUDY

- A - Socio-economic level.
- B - Emotional adjustment.
- C - Anxiety.
- A X B - Socio-economic level and emotional adjustment.
- A X C - Socio-economic level and Anxiety.
- B X C - Emotional adjustment and Anxiety.
- A X B X C - Socio-economic level and emotional adjustment and Anxiety.
- SEL - Socio-Economic level.
- EA - Emotional Adjustment.
- AX - Anxiety.
- LSEL(A₁) - Low socio-economic level.
- HSEL(A₂) - High socio-economic level.
- LEA (B₁) - Low emotional adjustment.
- HEA(B₂) - High emotional adjustment.
- LA(C₁) - Low anxiety.
- HA(C₂) - High anxiety.

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CHAPTER I

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INTRODUCTION

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Despite the all pervasive nature and influence of work, serious study of work behaviour is a very recent phenomenon. The chief historical event, which greatly influenced the study of human work and the problems man faces in performing it was, of course, the Industrial Revolution. It not only brought about several long-term effects on the nature of work itself, but also created a host of new problems in its wake.

As one of the most striking effects, modern industry has transformed work from a largely private activity to a predominantly public one. Millions of people who had hitherto spent their entire working lives as farmers, hunters, pastorals, or individual craftsmen, Industrial Revolution brought them together in large work groups, where their work behaviour was under almost continuous observation and control.

Another major consequence of the Industrial Revolution and the development of the factory system and a money economy required a kind of worker who was not tied to a plot of land, but was relatively free and mobile, who was in effect, the sole owner and disposer of his ability to work and who was free to sell his ability in an open labour market. The establishment of the free worker created a new

problem : the source of the individual motivation to work.

The first effort to carry out a scientific study of work behaviour were focused exclusively on work simply as a technical factor in the process of production. These investigations began at almost the turn of this century and were designed entirely to serve the interests of efficient factory management. F.W.Taylor (1911) is the recognized pioneer in what has come to be known as time-and-motion study or Scientific Management, a type of analysis of task performance, so that there is an over all increase in production of goods and services at a lower cost to the management. The modern speciality of industrial engineering is largely concerned with the most efficient deployment and organization of the relations between man and machines. There is now almost as much interest in adapting the machine to particular characteristics of the human machine-tender as in adapting the human being to the machine.

One of the important, although unintended outcomes of industrial engineering has been the recognition that human work cannot be easily reduced to so many quanta of mental and muscular energy. Work, after all, is performed by human beings, who bring into the work-place not only their intellectual and motor skills but also their individualities. Not until the early 1930's was it recognized that the attitudes, motivations, and personality of the worker might

be quite as important a condition of work as the manner in which work was organized or the particular conditions of illumination and ventilation.

Work is a social phenomenon that must be understood in the context of social institutions and structures. But work is performed by individual human beings, not societies. Most people in most societies must some how come to terms with the demands of work, but the manner in which each person meets this demand is a problem in individual psychology. A complete picture of human work must be based on the understanding that the conditions which influence it are not only social and historical, but also individual and personal.

One indisputable source of the desire of people to work, is the money they are paid for working. Although many people will disagree with the classical "economic man", few would dispute the importance of anticipated economic rewards in the guidance of human conduct. Despite the old saying that "money can't buy happiness", it can be exchanged for many commodities which are necessary for survival and comfort. The widespread interest in money as a motivational tool for supurring production was stimulated by F.W.Taylor. He thought that a worker could be made to produce more on the job which would lead to higher profits from lower fixed costs, which in turn could be used to pay the worker significantly more for his increased efforts. Such was the beginning of 'Scientific Management', which is based

essentially on the assumption that workers will put forth extra effort on the job to maximize their economic gains. This became a guiding principle in pay practices until the late 1920's when the 'human relations moment' in industrial psychology was ushered in with the Western Electric studies directed by Elton Mayo. As a result of these studies, recognition of man's ego and social needs became widespread, and job factors other than pay came to be emphasized as the major reasons why men work. Yet, few would disagree that money has been and continues to be the primary means of rewarding and modifying human behaviour in industry.

Wages represent an almost universal form of inducement for individuals to perform work. Most workers receive some kind of economic remuneration for working and formal organizations develop complex systems for determining the amount of remuneration payable to an individual worker. The size of a workers' weekly or monthly pay cheque is typically a complex resultant of a large number of factors including the intrinsic content of his job, the relative supply and demand for that job, the workers' seniority and his level of performance.

The point of interest and importance here is the effect of wages or the size of the pay packet in determining a worker's job satisfaction and the probability that he will remain in his job. Economists and many executives are prone to stress the importance of the pay cheque, the more the

amount of wages given the more satisfied the worker feels and will want to remain on his job. But the social scientists associated with the "human relations" movement typically view economic factors as highly over emphasized and stress the importance of the satisfaction of social and ego needs.

Both sides can find some support for their position. In a study by Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell (1957), workers were asked to rank different aspects of the work role in terms of their importance, wages tended to be rated as less important than security, opportunity for advancement, and company and management policies, but as more important than job content, supervision, and benefits. However, when they were asked to describe what makes them satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs, wages are found to be the most frequent source of dissatisfaction but the least frequent source of satisfaction. But here the criteria was worker's description of their motivations, which cannot be heavily relied upon.

When one considers correlational evidence, there is some data showing that income level is positively associated with job satisfaction. Several follow up studies of college graduates, like those conducted by Thompson, 1939; Miller, 1941; Barnett, Handelsman, Stewart and Super, 1952; provide support for such a relationship. Lawler and Porter (1963) determined the level of wages received by almost

2000 managers and found that this variable was positively related to satisfaction with wages, managerial level held constant. An investigation conducted by Smith and Kendall (1963) reported a correlation of .78 between the mean annual earnings of men in 21 plants and their mean job satisfaction as measured by the Job Descriptive Index. On the other hand Hoppock (1935) reported no significant difference in average earnings between one hundred well-satisfied and one hundred poorly-satisfied teachers matched for age and sex. The latter's results probably reflect the relatively restricted range of wages received by respondents in his study.

Another possibility that has been suggested is that satisfaction stemming from the receipt of wages is dependent not on the absolute amount of these wages, but on the relationship between that amount and some standard of comparison used by the individual. The standard may be an adaptation level (Helson, 1947) derived from wages received at previous times or a conception of the amount of wages received by other people.

The latter of these two possibilities has been most thoroughly explored. Patchen (1961) formulated the problem of satisfaction with wages in terms of social comparison theory. He assumed that individuals compare their own earnings with those of others in terms of their relative standing on dimensions believed to be the basis of

pay (e.g. skill, seniority, and education). Satisfaction with a specific wage comparison was hypothesized to be a function of the objective dissonance of the comparison. A comparison is termed objectively dissonant by Patchen when the ratio of the comparer's position on dimensions relevant to pay to another's position on these dimensions is culturally considered congruent with or appropriate to the ratio of their earnings. Thus, if one person compared himself with another person who was earning more but who was similar in his standing on dimensions related to pay, the comparison would be dissonant and would be expected to lead to dissatisfaction on the part of the comparer. Likewise, if he compared himself to someone who was earning the same but who was inferior in standing on dimensions related to pay, the comparison would also be objectively dissonant and accompanied by dissatisfaction. On the other hand, if a person compared himself to someone who was earning more and who was superior on dimensions related to pay, or to someone who was earning the same and was similar on dimensions related to pay, it would be objectively consonant and would be expected to result in satisfaction.

Evidence in support of the predicted relationship between the dissonance of wage comparisons and satisfaction has been obtained by Patchen (1961) in a study of workers in an oil refinery. These findings support the long held contention of many personnel managers that satisfaction is dependent on relative rather than absolute wage levels.

According to the cognitive model proposed by Vroom (1964), the attractiveness of a work role for a person is directly related to the extent to which it provides him with rewarding outcomes and inversely related to the extent to which it provides him with aversive outcomes. Thus, if money constitutes a reward for a person then the more money he makes from his work the more attracted he will be to his work role. If rejection by other people constitutes an aversive outcome, then the more he is rejected by his co-workers the less attracted he will be to his work role.

A somewhat different point of view is represented in the assumption that persons do not strive to maximize the attainment of desired outcomes like money but rather strive to obtain an equitable or fair amount. Basic to this position is the belief that individuals are guided by a moral system which has as a basic tenet the fair distribution of rewards. If a person receives less than a fair amount he feels that an injustice has been done to him, if he receives more than the fair amount he feels guilty.

In effect, this point of view regards job satisfaction as a function of the amount of differences between the amount of reward that the person believes he should receive and the amount of reward which in fact he does receive. The greater the difference between these two amounts, the greater the tension or disequilibrium experienced by the persons.

Although such a model may be applicable to any dimensions of reward, it is most frequently regarded as applicable to wages. All systems of wage and salary administration contain the implicit assumption that there is a fair and equitable level of compensation for each worker on each job. Jaques (1961) has provided a psychological basis for this assumption with his hypothesis that a state of disequilibrium is created within a person whenever his actual level of payment deviates from the equitable level, regardless of the direction of the disparity. According to this hypothesis, if a person believes that he should receive a salary of Rs.200/- per month but in fact receives Rs.150/- per month, he will experience feelings of tension and inequity and strive to reduce the discrepancy. If the same person receives a salary of Rs.250/- per month he will also experience tension and inequity and seek to reduce the discrepancy. Jacques, through the investigation he carried out on supervisors and manual workers in six different British firms, professes to have uncovered "the existence of an unrecognized system of norms of fair payment for any given level of work, unconscious knowledge of these norms being shared among the population engaged in employment work" (page 124).

Zaleznik, Christensen and Rothlisberger (1958), also studied the effects of wage inequity on worker satisfaction. They tried to infer what workers should regard as equitable pay from their age, seniority, education, ethnicity,

and sex, all of which are assumed to indicate the extent of their "investment" in their job. They predicted that workers whose degree of reward was favourable in comparison with their investments would express a greater degree of satisfaction than workers whose degree of reward was unfavourable in relation to their investments. To test this prediction, they constructed a reward-investment index and obtained a score for each of 47 workers. The index was intended to express the difference between what the workers received from their jobs and what they invested in it. Contrary to prediction, satisfaction scores were not associated with scores on this reward - investment index. However, the authors acknowledge the weakness in this crude test and tend to regard this finding as due to methodological inadequacies rather than to defects in their theory.

A more elaborate and detailed conception of equity has appeared in recent writings. Equity and its opposite, inequity, are defined in relative rather than absolute terms. Inequity is assumed to result, not from a discrepancy between rewards received from and investments made in one's job, but from discrepancies in the relative magnitudes of rewards and investments of a person and those of other person with whom he compares himself. An individual's perceptions of rewards and investments of others is thought to provide him with a standard against which he judges the fairness and equity of rewards which he himself receives. We will have more to say

about this concept of inequity latter.

Another field where wages play an important part, is their effect on worker's motivation to perform their jobs effectively. One possibility is that the strength of a worker's motivation to perform effectively is directly related to the amount of his wages. The more wages he receives the higher his motivation to do an effective job. There is little evidence in support of such a relationship. There is no reliable data indicating that increases in wages increases level of performance or that decreases in wages decreases level of performance.

Adams theory of equity (1963, a), has implications for the effect of amount of wages on worker productivity. According to this theory, the employment relationship is a case of an exchange between an employer and employee. The employee exchanges his services for pay from the employer. On the employee's side of the exchange are his "inputs" - education, experience, training, skill, intelligence, sex, age, seniority, ethnic background, social status, and the effort he expends on the job. On the employer's side of the exchange are the "outcomes" or rewards provided to the employee for his services. These include pay, rewards intrinsic to the job, security benefits, fringe benefits and status symbols.

Inequity is said to exist for an employee

"whenever his perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he perceives are the inputs and/or outcomes of others", (Adams, 1963).

If a person's inputs exceed those of other, but his outcomes are the same or less, then inequity exists. Similarly, if a person's inputs are less than those of "other," but his outcomes are greater or same, inequity also exists. In computing the amount of inequity existing in a given person - other relationship, Adams, employs the following mathematical formula :

$$\text{Inequity} = \frac{\text{person's inputs} - \text{person's outcomes}}{\text{other's inputs} - \text{other's outcomes}}.$$

According to this theory, workers strive to attain an equitable relationship between their job inputs and outcomes and those of "other". If a worker believes that he is overpaid relative to others with the same inputs, he is predicted to experience feelings of inequity and tension which he will try to reduce. One means of doing this is to increase his inputs to his job which may include increasing his level of performance. Similarly, if he believes that he is being underpaid relative to other with the same inputs, he is predicted to experience feelings of inequity and tension which could be reduced by decreasing his level of performance.

The way a person reduces the feeling of inequity and tension may vary from person to person and for a

particular person over time, but can include any one or a combination of the following : (1) distorting one's own or the other's inputs and/or outcomes; (2) withdrawing from the situation and (3) changing the comparison against whom he compares his input-outcome ratio. Which of these methods will be chosen ? Adams predicts that the person will choose whichever method is easiest. It should be noted that this theory doesnot predict that increases in wages will necessarily result in increased productivity or that decreased wages will necessarily result in decreased productivity. Productivity changes would be expected only when changes in wages affects worker's feelings regarding the equity of their wages in relation to those of 'others'.

Existing evidence provides support for these predictions. Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) carried out 2 experiments, their results indicate that unqualified Ss produced more than qualified Ss when paid hourly. Unqualified piece rate Ss produced less than qualified piece rate Ss. Garland (1973) tested two hypotheses derived from equity theory, in general, the results support the hypotheses. Although a person on piece-work, who believes he is being overcompensated cannot reduce his feelings of inequity by increasing the quantity of his performance, he can accomplish the same effect by improving the quality of his work. This possibility was investigated and found to be true by an experiment carried out by Adams and Jacobsen (1964).

Goodman and Friedman (1969); Moors and Baron (1973); Wilke and Steur (1972); are some other investigators who support the assumptions of equity theory as related to work performance and work quality.

Recent investigators have studied inequity or equity and different factors related to it by using the allocation of reward method. Social work settings are often so constructed that a work group consisting of two or more receives a reward according to the group member's combined achievement. The following two methods predominate among the various possibilities for dividing the reward in such situations : (a) The reward is equally divided among the partners, disregarding individual performance (equality), (b) The reward is divided according to the contribution of each individual member of the total group output (equity).

Every social system contains rewards and resources that are used to achieve group goals and satisfy individual needs. Members of the system occupy different roles in relation to these rewards and resources. Some individuals serve as allocators who dispense them while other individuals are recipients. The allocator's decisions regarding the distribution of reward and resources is influenced by his superiors or subordinates also other parties who observe the allocator.

In any work group the problems emanate from the task environment and the interpersonal environment within

the group (Bales, 1950; Homans, 1950; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). Rewards and resources serve three main functions in relation to these problems, namely : (1) resources are required for the conduct of activities that solve task or socio-emotional problems; (2) rewards reinforce and strengthen recipient behaviour that contributes to the solution of these problems; (3) rewards and resources make group membership attractive to recipients and strengthens their loyalty.

Adams (1963, 1965) equity theory suggests that an allocator will deliver rewards and resources to recipients in proportion to the usefulness of their action. Numerous studies confirm this basic implication of the model (Lane & Messe', 1971; Lane, Messe', and Phillips, 1971; Leventhal and Michaels, 1969, 1971). The equity model identifies important psychological processes and causal variables that must be taken into account in the study of allocation behaviour. However, by itself, the model provides too limited a framework for a comprehensive analysis of allocation behaviour. Adams' (1965) statement of equity theory and Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) recent restatement of the theory, deals primarily with the influence of a single normative rule which dictates that rewards and resources be distributed in accordance with recipients contribution. However, many other motivational and cognitive factors influence an allocator's decision. For example, the rule of equity is only one of

several possible norms the allocator may follow. Thus, instead of rewarding recipients in accordance with their inputs, an allocator may follow a rule of allocating in accordance with their needs or a rule of equal distribution.

Allocation decisions are instrumental acts through which the allocator tries to achieve various goals. Allocation norms constitute one important class of such motivational factors. An 'allocation norm' may be defined as a social rule which specifies criteria that define certain distributions of rewards and resources as fair and just. Lerner (1974 a, b) and Pruitt (1972) suggest, an allocator may follow a number of alternative allocation norms. For example, he may follow a rule of equity and distribute rewards and resources in accordance with recipients' contributions; follow a norm of equality and give all recipients the same, regardless of their contributions; follow a norm of reciprocity and treat recipients as they have treated him; follow norms of responsiveness to need and give more to recipients with greater need; or follow a norm of "adhering to commitments" and allocate in accordance with prior agreements between himself and recipients.

Typically, several allocation norms are salient at one time and the social system favours some allocation norms more than others. Thus, an allocators' decision to comply with one allocation norm rather than another, represents not

only an attempt to be fair and just, but also an attempt to gain the unique pattern of instrumental benefits that is associated with following that norm.

As has already been suggested allocator follows one allocation norm rather than another primarily because following that norm has beneficial effects. For example, there is reason to believe that equitable allocation help foster high levels of task performance. A large body of theory and research suggests that delivering high reward to good performers and low reward to poor performers often facilitates productivity (e.g. Bales, 1950; Burnstein, 1969; Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Homans, 1961; Lawler, 1971; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Steiner, 1972). Numerous studies conducted in laboratory and field settings indicate that reward systems which closely tie a recipient's rewards to his performance often elicit better performance (Lawler, 1971). It seems likely that an allocator who distributes rewards equitably frequently does so more because he desires to maximize long-term productivity than because he desires to comply with an abstract standard of justice. His decisions are based on an expectancy that equitable distributions of reward will elicit and sustain high levels of motivation and performance.

But it has been seen that equitable allocation donot always foster high productivity. For example, rewarding

recipients in accordance with their apparent contributions may be counter productive if it is difficult to assess individual contributions accurately, or if a high level of cooperation among recipients is essential for effective performance (Lawler, 1971; Steiner, 1972). Allocators probably recognize that productivity is not always facilitated by a strict policy of rewarding recipients in accordance with their contributions. Consequently, there are instances when an allocator deviates markedly from the equity norm even though his primary goal is to elicit a high level of performance.

The fact that equitable allocations may arouse negative feelings in poor performers points to the importance of distinguishing between allocation strategies that cope with task problems and allocation strategies that cope with socio-emotional problems. It has been suggested that an allocator follows the equity norm to cope with task problems, i.e. to maximize recipients' performance. However, strict adherence to the rule of equity may cause socio-emotional problems by arousing dissatisfaction and resentment among poor performers. Consequently, an allocator whose primary concern is to cope with socio-emotional problems and minimize negative responses may often move away from adherence to the equity norm.

The striving for equal distribution or equality in reward distribution in a social setting has been emphasized

by Sampson (1969). Studies by Garrett (1973); Kahn (1972); Lane and Coon (1972); Lerner (1974 a); Leventhal, Popp, and Sawyer (1973); Lichtman (1972); Pruitt (1972), show that an allocator sometimes ignores differences in recipients' inputs and distributes rewards equally. He is especially likely to follow the equality norm in settings in which it is widely regarded as the most appropriate rule of allocation and others expect him to follow it. However his decision to follow equality is also influenced by a desire to obtain certain benefits associated with equal distribution. For example, equality of reward may foster harmony and solidarity (Bales, 1950). Studies of the effect of different distributions of reward on interpersonal relationships indicates that equal distributions tend to produce a high level of satisfaction and harmony among group members (Julian and Perry, 1967; Smith and Cook, 1973; Steiner, 1972). Consequently, the allocator who follows the equality norm as a criterion of fair distribution is also likely to elicit a high level of solidarity. That is why an allocator often follows the equality norm because he believes it helps — resolve problems arising from the group's interpersonal environment (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Homans, 1950). More significantly, he believes equal allocations reduce negative socio-emotional behaviours such as dissatisfaction and antagonism.

Thus, if an allocator's primary goal is to maximize

productivity, he favours the equity norm because equitable allocations help maximize group productivity over the long run. If his primary goal is to minimize antagonism and maintain solidarity, he favours the equality norm because equal allocations foster interpersonal harmony.

As the results of different studies show, the actual mode of distribution may depend on any number of factors, e.g. sex of the person dividing the reward (Leventhal and Lane, 1970; Mikula 1972 b); the nature of the partner's relationship (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967); the performance ratio of the dyad (Mikula, 1972 c); sexual composition of the dyad (Mikula 1972 a); and expectation of future interaction on reward allocation (Shapiro, 1975) to name a few.

Wage inequities are a perennial concern of management and labour, and are frequent cause of grievances, indeed, of strikes, and may lead to lower productivity. These result in anguish, frustration, and one might predict, a host of psychogenic complaints, absenteeism, and so on. The purpose of this investigation is to varify the effects of socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and level of anxiety on the equal or equitable distribution of rewards by co-workers in a triad.

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== CHAPTER II ==
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== A SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE ==
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In this chapter the various relevant theoretical papers are reviewed followed by the different research papers published with brief description of the task, subjects, independent and dependent variables and results of each paper.

Adams (1963 a) presents a general theory of inequity based on social exchange, social comparison, and cognitive dissonance theories. He presents a theory of social inequity, with special consideration given to wage inequities. A special case of Festinger's cognitive dissonance, the theory specifies the conditions under which inequity will arise and the means by which it may be reduced or eliminated. In this paper, observational field studies supporting the theory and laboratory experiments designed to test certain aspects of it are described.

Another theoretical paper presented by Adams in L.Berkowitz (Ed.), (1965), extends equity theory first presented in Adams (1963 a). Social exchange, relative deprivation, distributive justice, and other related theories are discussed.

Anderson, Berger, Zelditch, and Cohen (1969) have based their theoretical discussion of relative deprivation,

distributive justice, and equity from a sociological viewpoint.

Blau (1964) in his book "Exchange and power in social life" discusses the concepts of justice, fair exchange and distributive justice as effecting social exchange and feeling of inequity.

Homans (1961) presents his theory of distributive justice in his book of "Social behaviour : Its elementary forms."

Zaleznik, Christensen, and Roethlisberger (1958) in their book, "The motivation, productivity, and satisfaction of Workers", have discussed the theory of distributive justice together with a number of illustrative cases.

Zaleznik and Moment (1964) in "The dynamics of interpersonal behaviour", have discussed the concepts of distributive justice and relative deprivation in the context of job satisfaction.

Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1970) discuss harmdoing as producing inequity between two people. They have presented theory and data which predict when a harm doer will provide restitution to a victim and when he will justify his act.

In another paper, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) revise, extend and generalize previous equity theory

and present a general theory of social behaviour. They have reviewed previous equity research and the relationship of equity theory to other major social psychological theories is examined.

The following is a review of the research papers presented on equity in the various journals of psychology and also reference is given of certain unpublished manuscripts taken from "Equity Theory : Toward a General Theory of Social Interaction" by Berkowitz and Walster (Ed.)(1976).

Adams (1963 b) conducted three experiments using public interviewing as the task to be done by the subjects (Ss). His IV : was (1) Ss paid at hourly or piece rate; (2) Ss induced to feel qualified or unqualified for pay rate and DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work Quality. The results show that unqualified hourly Ss' productivity was higher than qualified hourly paid Ss. Unqualified piece rate Ss work quality was greater and their productivity was lower than qualified piece rate Ss.

Adams and Jacobsen (1964) gave their subjects to proofread galleys and they were paid on the basis of piece rate. IV : (1) male Ss paid 30 ¢ / page and either told they were qualified or unqualified for task, or told that they were unqualified and thus paid at the reduced rate of 20 ¢ /page; (2) Ss told work might be available for several

months or that it would not. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. Their results show that unqualified Ss paid 30 ¢ / page produced less but higher quality work than qualified Ss paid 30 ¢ / page and unqualified Ss paid 20 ¢ / page reduced rate. The latter two groups didnot differ.

Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) in another experiment used public interviewing as the task to be done by their subjects. The IV : (1) in 2 experiments Ss were told that they were qualified or unqualified for interviewing; (2) hourly or piece rate pay. DV : Productivity. Results indicate that unqualified Ss produced more than qualified Ss when paid hourly. Unqualified piece rate Ss produced less than qualified piece rate Ss.

Anderson and Shelly (1970) replicated Adams' experiment and gave their subjects proof reading tasks on hourly pay. Their IV : Ss told they were qualified or under qualified for task; (2) underqualified Ss were told either that qualification test usually or always predicts proof-reading success. The DV : (1) Productivity; (2) quality of work. The results showed no difference between the experimental groups.

Anderson and Shelly (1971) in another experiment failed to obtain empirical support for the hypothesis that inequity dissonance will occur only among overrewarded Ss if

they receive or expect to receive signs of disapproval from an authority figure or equitably rewarded group members.

Andrews (1967) in an experiment used interviewing or data checking as the task to be done by the subjects for which they were paid according to piece rate. The IV : (1) Interesting (interviewing) or dull (data checking) task; (2) underpay (15 ¢), equitable (20 ¢) pay, or overpay (30 ¢); (3) S's previous wage experience. The DV : (1) productivity; (2) work quality. The results obtained show that underpaid Ss produced more but at a lower quality level than equitably paid Ss. Overpaid Ss produced less but at higher quality than equitably paid Ss. Ss' previous wage experience was positively related to productivity and negatively to quality within piece rate groups. No effect of task interest was observed.

Andrews and Valenzi (1970) using role projection method made the Ss watch an induction procedure in which a job applicant was unqualified for the pay he would receive. DV : Ss' responses to questions about how they would feel if they were the applicant. The results show that 59 out of the 80 Ss responded in terms of their self image. No Ss responded in terms of inequity. Ratings of structured alternatives indicated that Ss felt self-image responses were most plausible and wage inequity responses the least plausible.

Arrowood (1961) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation gave public interviewing as the task to his subjects who were paid for 3 hours before the task performance. The IV : (1) pay too high or about right relative to qualifications; (2) S's work either returned or not to payer. DV : productivity. The results from equity theory indicate that Ss who perceived pay too high relative to their qualifications were more productive than those whose pay was about right. Interpreting the results on the basis of reinforcement theory show that Ss whose work was available to source of pay to be more productive than Ss whose work was not available to source.

Bass (1968) studied Graduate business students who were asked to recommend annual salary increases for 10 hypothetical engineers with varying characteristics. The results show that Ss with lower intelligence and achievement who had strong social and religious values and who were generous with company money for other purposes made higher-salary recommendations.

Benton (1971) following preliminary tasks made his subjects, boys in pairs and girls in pairs to bargain over division of reward. IV : (1) S passed or failed reading test; (2) pairs were friends, non-friends, neutra; (3) sex of pair. DV : Allocation of reward. Results show that girls prefer equality norm, but adopt equity norm if equal division

is impossible. Boys prefer equity norm, but this may be overridden by competitive achievement motivation.

Berscheid, Boye, and Walster (1968) in their experiment made Ss allegedly participate as "trainers", administering shocks, or "observers" in study of shock on verbal performance of confederate peer ("Victim"). IV : (1) Harm-doer (exp.gp.) or observer (control gp.); (2) expected or do not expect victim to be able to administer shock. DV : Ss' derogation of victim. The study lead to the following results, the harm-doers derogate victims less when they expect retaliation than when they do not, but observers respond in reverse manner.

Berscheid and Walster (1967) led female Ss in the course of a game to deprive a fellow church member (victim) of green stamp books. In a second game they had a chance to compensate the victim. The IV : (1) Insufficient, adequate, or excessive compensation available to Ss; (2) chance to award compensation to victim (exp. gp.) or to crippled child (control gp.). DV : Choice to compensate. The results indicate that experimental Ss were more likely to compensate victim if available compensation was adequate than if the compensation was insufficient or excessive. The same was not found among the control Ss.

In another similar experiment Berscheid, Walster, and Barclay (1969) made the Ss play a question-answer game

in which they deprived their partner of green stamp books. In second game, they could give bonus to partner. The IV : (1) S able to inadequately, adequately, or overcompensate their partner (victim); (2) S required to choose to compensate immediately or after a delay. DV : Whether or not Ss compensated victims. The results of the study show that Ss in the immediate condition compensated the victim regardless of the adequacy of compensation. Ss in the delay condition were more likely to compensate in the adequate compensation condition than Ss in the inadequate and excessive compensation condition.

Blumstein and Weinstein (1969) made the Ss and confederate partners write questionnaire items. The IV: (1) Partner did large or small proportion of work; (2) S's partner claimed to have done $1/3$ or $2/3$ of the work; (3) Ss' score on Machiavellianism; (4) Ss' score on Need for Approval; (5) Ss' sex. DV : (1) The amount of work claimed by S on a second set of items; (2) S's evaluation of partner. The results show that the Ss who benefited from the partner's claim redressed the injustice more than Ss who were victims. Females and Ss high on machiavellianism and Need for Approval did not redress in reward allocation why they were victims.

Brickman and Bryan (1974) made 5th grade girls view a movie of 7th grade girl who surreptitiously modifies distribution of rewards in 4-person group. IV : (1) Girl in

the movie increases or decreases equality among group members by her transfers; (2) girl in the movie either increases her own resources (theft), decreases her own resources (Charity), or changes the rewards of 2 other group members in a disinterested way. DV : (1) Ss' attitude toward the 7th grade girl; (2) Ss' ratings of fairness of final distribution. Analysis of the results showed that charity transfers rated more favourably if they increased equality. This was not true of thefts. Disinterested changes in rewards of two other members were rated more favourably in they increased equality than if they decreased equality.

Burnstein and Wilosin (1968) made pairs of Ss work on a group reaction-time task in which each S initially had equal responsibility for joint outcome. IV : (1) Ss told performance reflected important or unimportant skill, or was chance; (2) One S 50% successful, other 50%, 70% or 90%. DV : Ss' decisions on how much responsibility each member should have in determination of joint outcomes. Results show that Ss divided responsibility for maximum joint outcomes. Redistribution of responsibility slower when performance difference between Ss was smaller and task was important.

Callahan and Messe' (1973) used same sex pairs of one S and one confederate who worked for 3 periods, respectively, as supervisor and worker in simulated industrial situation in which workers addressed envelopes and supervisor



paid him according to his assessed performance. IV : (1) sex of pairs; (2) high or low fate control of S; (3) Worker had counter power or no counter power in affecting S's pay; (4) worker performance (low in 3 periods vs. low in first and medium in last 2); (5) work period. DV : (1) S's pay allocation to worker; (2) S's reasons for allocation. Results point out that males (not females) paid workers most when they had high fate control and worker had counter power. Ss moved by equity considerations when worker had no counter power males were found to be more concerned with behaviour control and females with equity.

Clark (1958) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation studied supermarket checkout counters manned by "ringer" (Cashier) and "bundler". Results show that inequities resulting from bundler (low status) having higher inputs than ringer (higher status) were inversely related to labour efficiency.

Cohen (1974) made pairs of Ss jointly perform group reaction time task; success rate for one S was 80%, 50% for other; the pair allegedly competing against other groups. IV : (1) success rate wholly under voluntary control of Ss or partially under uncontrollable factors; (2) high, medium, low criterion of group success to beat other groups. DV : Distribution of bonus reward. Analysis of the results show that inferior member (50%) in nonvoluntary condition were given

more of bonus reward than in voluntary condition. Also they were given more reward as the criterion of group success increased.

Cook (1969) made the Ss perform proofreading task for which they were paid on hourly basis. IV : Ss underpaid, equitably paid, or overpaid in relation to expected pay. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality; (3) attitudes toward task. Results show that the perceived and actual performance was higher among overpaid Ss than other Ss. A time and payment interaction was found for attitude toward the task. Underpaid Ss initially liking the task material more than disliking it, and finally liking it as much as equitably paid Ss.

 Dansereau, Cashman, and Graen (1973) conducted a longitudinal correlational study of 261 salaried managers, and found out that high performers who were not differentially compensated in comparison to low performers were much more likely than average to leave the organization. In contrast, when performance and compensation were contingently related, manager were more likely than average to stay. 

Day (1961) in his unpublished master's thesis made children push plunger for candies. The number of candies (between 1 to 6) were dependent on pressure exerted on plunger. After the responses had stabilized, 25 candies were received by S on last 5 trials. DV : Pressure exerted on overrewarded

trials. The results show that the Ss increased pressure when they were overrewarded.

Day (1961) created varying degrees of inequity in 3-person work groups. Some equity theory predictions failed but production help and pay reallocation within groups were found to be significant means of reducing inequity; the use of these means increased as inequity increased.

Deci (1972) made Ss work on puzzles, after which they were free to do several things, including work on the puzzle. The IV : (1) verbal or no verbal reinforcement for puzzle solving task; (2) no payment for task vs. overpayment at the end of the task vs. overpayment after the free-choice period following the task; (3) sex. DV : Time spent working on puzzles during free-choice period. The study led to show that Ss worked on puzzles more during free time when paid before free-choice period and less when paid after the period than Ss who were not paid.

Evan and Simmons (1969) conducted 2 experiments, where S proofread galleys in a publisher's premises and were paid for the job on hourly basis. IV : Equitably paid, overpaid, or underpaid in relation to induced competence or to induced authority. DV : (1) Productivity, (2) Work quality. Results show that there was no differential effects of pay-authority discrepancies. Pay-competence discrepancies resulted in underpaid Ss producing more but the work quality was poor.

Evans and Molinari (1970) made their S do interviewing task for which they were paid on the basis of piece rate. The IV : (1) High or low job security; (2) Ss told they were qualified or underqualified for pay rate. The DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. The analysis of result showed that there was a trend among unqualified (overpaid) Ss in both secure and insecure conditions to produce better quality work than qualified Ss. Security and qualification interacted such that productivity was greater among qualified secure Ss than unqualified secure ones, whereas productivity was greater among unqualified insecure Ss than qualified insecure ones.

Finn & Lee (1972) made professional and scientific employees in Federal Public Health Service answer questionnaire measuring demographic and work history information; perception of job inputs, salary treatment, and job-related attitudes. Ss' immediate superiors also completed the questionnaire. The results show that Ss in inequitably treated subsample displayed less favourable job-related attitudes and had a higher propensity to quit their job than Ss in equitably treated subsample. Multiple regression model predicted equitable salaries ($R = .933$).

Friedman & Goodman (1967) gave their subjects interviewing task for which they were paid \$ 3.50 on hourly basis. The IV : (1) Ss told that they were qualified or

underqualified; (2) Ss' perceptions of his qualifications.

DV : Productivity. The results show that the qualification induction did not affect productivity. When Ss were classified according to their perceived qualifications, however, qualified Ss produced more than unqualified Ss.

Garland (1972) in his unpublished manuscript used proofreading material containing error as his task and paid his subjects on the basis of piece rate. The IV : (1) Ss hired at 15 ¢, 30 ¢, or 60 ¢ page rate and told by a confederate worker that his pay was 30 ¢ page; (2) sex. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality. The results indicate that underpaid males and females produced more work whereas when overpaid they produce less work than equitably paid Ss. Overpaid males produced better quality work but poorer quality if underpaid. Underpaid females did poorer work than equitably paid females, but the overpaid female's work was not better than the latter's.

Garrett (1973) presented a paper in which Ss were asked to allocate \$ 15.40 among 4 hypothetical work group members varying systematically in effort and performance. IV : (1) High or low S score on Mirels-Garrett Protestant Ethic Scale; (2) performance and effort description of member : Hi-hi, hi-lo, lo-hi, lo-lo. DV : Amount of money allocated to each of 4 work group members. The results show that Ss with high Protestant Ethic scale scores used equity

as a basis of reward allocation more than low scorers.

Garrett & Libby (1973) made 9th graders perform proofreading task with hypothetical partner who allocated reward after task. S was then allowed to allocate bonus. IV : (1) Ss told reward allocation by partner was chance or intentional; (2) after performing equally with partner, S was overrewarded or underrewarded. DV : (1) S's allocation of **bonus**; (2) S's rating of partner (good-bad, fair-unfair). The study showed the Ss distributed bonus to restore equity when partner's initial allocation was intentional. Bonus allocated about equally, ignoring the first reward allocation, when partner's initial allocation was by chance.

Gergen, Morse and Bode (1971) in their unpublished study made American and Italian Ss attempt to identify words (English or Italian) transmitted with noise over a speaker. IV : (1) Ss told that they would receive same pay as, 40% or 80% more, or 40% less than they felt was correct for task. DV : (1) Performance, (2) evaluation of task difficulty; (3) perceived fair rate of pay for task. Results show that overpaid Ss' evaluation of task difficulty and fair rate of pay increased compared to equitably paid Ss. No systematic effects of pay on task performance was observed.

Giles and Barrett (1971) made sixtyfour professional employees in electronics company respond to questionnaire on merit increases and satisfaction. The results show that

satisfaction with pay increases was better predicted by the ratio of merit increases to perceived equitable merit increase than by merit increase proper, percentage merit increase, and salary plus increase.

Goodman & Friedman (1968) used questionnaire scoring as the task for which the Ss were paid on the hourly basis.

IV : Six pay conditions : (1) Ss overpaid with emphasis on quantity of questionnaires scored; (2) overpaid with quality emphasis; (3) overpaid Ss with quantity emphasis told the production rate of qualified scorers; (4) Ss paid at reduced rate because of lack of qualifications; (5) Ss paid at reduced rate because of lack of qualifications and told the production rate of people with similar qualifications; (6) Ss told they were qualified and paid equitably. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. Results of this study show the overpaid Ss produced more than equitably paid Ss. Emphasis on quantity or quality effects Ss emphasis during performance, known production rated reduced the production variance of Ss.

In another study Goodman and Friedman (1969) again used questionnaire scoring as the task for which the subjects were paid on piece rate basis. IV : (1) Ss told they were qualified or underqualified for task; (2) E's emphasis on quality and quantity. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. The results of this study show that underqualified Ss reduced inequity by increasing productivity or quality

depending on E's emphasis. Production differences between quality and quantity emphasis conditions was found to be greater for underqualified than for qualified Ss.

Greenberg & Leventhal (1973) presented a paper where Ss considered a business case in which two 2-man groups working on special projects were described. Ss were asked to recommend money bonus for each worker. IV : (1) one worker in each group had above average performance, the other below average; (2) one group, it was stated, would definitely fail if it continued to perform as it had, while the other group would easily succeed; (3) half the Ss were instructed to award bonus on basis of performance, the others so as to motivate workers; (4) sex. DV : Bonus allocation. The results show that Ss instructed to motivate workers gave greater bonuses to workers of failing groups than did Ss instructed to maintain equity. This resulted also in higher bonuses for failing than succeeding groups. Ss instructed to reward for performance rewarded succeeding group more than failing ones. Better performing members within groups were allocated larger bonuses.

Greenberg, Block and Silverman (1971) made the S and a confederate role-play disabled workers performing task in which S required help. In second task confederate was potential recipient of help from S. IV : Confederate's help ~~fx~~ in first task resulted in high extrareward for S at low

cost to confederate, low extra reward for S at moderate cost to confederate, or no extra reward for S at high cost to confederate. DV : Amount of help S gave confederate on second task. The results show that Ss were more likely to help if confederate's previous help had resulted in high or moderate rewards for S than if help resulted in low or no rewards.

Greenber & Frisch (1972) used male Ss in their study who were required to complete a sales forecast for which they needed help from a fictitious other; then Ss performed personnel task for which help was requested by other. IV : (1) Help given by other was deliberate or accidental; (2) much or little help given by other. DV : Help given by S on second task. The results show that more help was given in deliberate than accidental condition. Also more help was given in high help than low help condition.

In another study Greenberg and Shapiro (1971) used Ss with his arm in sling and confederate with an eye patch and sunglasses were asked to first assemble boxes, then to proof read copy for errors. IV : (1) S anticipated he would or would not be able to reciprocate help; (2) sex. DV : Ss willingness to ask for help from confederate. Results shows, Ss unable to reciprocate help was less likely to ask for it from confederate than Ss who anticipated that they could help confederate on second task.

Hoccoun, Wood, & Smith (1973) presented a paper in which they did a 3-stage experiment with piece rate pay. Ss working with a confederate were first induced to believe their rate was same, greater, or lower than confederate's. E then equalized the pay. Results show that underpaid Ss produced more. Productivity was greater when confederate's pay rate was changed to equal Ss than when S's was changed to equal confederate's.

Heslin & Blake (1969) in another paper had Ss signed up for task for which they would be paid by the hour. IV : (1) Interesting (puzzle) vs. boring task (packing); (2) Under payment, usual payment, or overpayment; (3) high vs. low commitment. DV : Productivity. Results show that committed Ss produced more than non-committed Ss.

Hinton (1972) used groups of 9 Ss who checked and collated IBM cards. IV : (1) Ss on hourly pay : underpaid, overpaid, or equitably paid; (2) Ss on piece rate : underpaid, overpaid, or equitably paid; (3) Ss worked independantly, in task-dependent subgroups of 3 with each 3 subgroups paid differently, or in task dependent subgroups of 3 with each member receiving different pay but subgroups receiving same pay. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality. Results show that hourly paid Ss produced less but higher quality work than piece rate Ss. Availability of relevant referents and group settings were important in determining performance.

Hinton & Barrow (1973) in their unpublished manuscript did a laboratory experiment of superior - subordinate reciprocal reinforcement, the reluctance of a superior to use equal negative reinforcement when his own are negative suggests that equity motivation may not operate in the negative range of outcomes.

Homans (1953) in an observational study of female clerical workers, found that, equal pay among clerks of different status was perceived as inequitable and resulted in dissatisfaction and efforts were made to bring pay in line with status.

Johnson (1973) used 6th graders who coded questionnaires in his study. IV : (1) Piece rate or hourly pay; (2) equity, mild inequity, or strong inequity. MV : S's socioeconomic status, high or low. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality. Results supported the equity theory predictions among higher SES but not among lower SES Ss.

Kahn (1972) used pairs of Ss who first worked on proofreading as groups and "partner" distributed reward; they then worked individually on second proof reading task and "subject" allocated rewards. IV : (1) Partner's qualifications, high or low; (2) sex; (3) S overpaid, equitably paid, or underpaid after first task. DV : S's allocation of rewards after second task. Results show that underpaid Ss took more

and overpaid Ss took less of the second reward than equitably paid Ss. Equity-restoring allocations were only partial; a bias toward equal allocation was observed.

Kalt (1969) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation made his Ss do interviewing for 3 one-hour sessions at \$ 2/hr. IV : Ss were told that they had done well (equitably paid) or poorly (overpaid) on selection test. DV : (1) Productivity, (2) quality of work; (3) job ratings. Results show overpaid Ss produced more on first day than equitably paid Ss. Ss more productive on first session rated their qualifications more favourably on the next two sessions than less productive Ss.

Kessler & Wiener (1972) made their subjects do word manipulation for which they were paid on the hourly basis. IV : (1) Ss told they were qualified or overqualified; (2) Ss believed they were working on ego-oriented task dependent on intelligence or on simple clerical task. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality. The study showed that productivity was lower among overqualified Ss than qualified Ss. The work quality was found to be higher among overqualified Ss.

Klein (1973) did a study to determine the relative predictive value of equity, expectancy, and reinforcement theories, questionnaires were given to blue collar workers to measure their past salary reinforcement, expected future

salary treatment, and perceived equity. Results show that equity and expectancy predicted job satisfaction, equity being the more powerful predictor.

Lane and Coon (1972) used preschool children as their subjects and made them do sticker pasting with fictitious partner; Ss then divided team reward after the task. IV : (1) 4-to 5-year old Ss; (2) sex; (3) S-partner inputs : 5-5, 5-15, 15-5, 15-15 stickers. DV : Reward allocation by S. Results show that 4-year-old Ss allocate rewards on basis of self-interest; 5-year-old Ss allocate rewards on basis of equality, non equity.

Lane, Coon, & Lichtman (1973) presented a paper in which they made children view video-taped TV program of 2 adults playing a ball game for which they would receive money in relation to their performance. Awards were allocated to players by Ss. IV : (1) Ss in Kindergarten, 2nd, 4th, or 6th grade; (2) insufficient, sufficient, or oversufficient rewards available for Ss' distribution to the winner and loser of game; (3) S's sex. DV : Reward distribution. The study lead to the following conclusion, Ss allocated a greater proportion of reward to the winner in the insufficient and oversufficient conditions than in the sufficient condition. With insufficient rewards, older Ss distributed rewards more equitably than younger Ss. Generally, the norm of equity was the most important determiner of reward allocation.

Lane and Messe' (1971) conducted 2 experiments in which Ss completed various paper and pencil instruments, then distributed rewards to selves and partners when both had equal inputs (first expt.) and when their inputs varied systematically (second expt.). DV : Reward distribution. Results of this study show that equity theory predictions were generally upheld with respect to frequency of allocation responses. Allocation in second experiment was principally influenced by inputs of partner.

In another study Lane and Messe' (1972) made S and confederate partner work on industrial relations questionnaire IV : (1) S and partner worked for varying amounts of time; (2) different amounts of money for S to allocate to self and partner. DV : S's allocations. Results show that Ss allocated money equally when contributions were equal, but only if total money available was consistent with internal standard of fair pay. If the total amount was more or less than this, Ss allocated proportionately more to themselves.

Lane, Messe', and Phillips (1971) used answering questionnaires as the task for their subjects. The IV : Ss in triads in which one S worked 3 hrs., one S 2 hrs., and one S 1 hr. on proportionate number of questionnaires. DV : (1) Each S's allocation of \$ 12; (2) Which other S in the triad would S vote for to allocate rewards. Results show that Ss allocated rewards equitably in terms of hours worked. Ss voted

for other Ss in the triad whose hour inputs were the highest and most similar to their own to allocate rewards.

Lawler III (1965) had managers from government and private organizations respond to questionnaire about pay. The result analysis showed that Ss reported that the difference between their pay and pay of their superiors and subordinates was too small. Subjects overestimated subordinates' pay.

In another study Lawler III (1968) made his subjects do public interviewing for which they were paid on the hourly basis. IV : Ss overpaid (low qualifications for task), over paid by circumstance (qualified), or equitably paid (qualified). DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality; (3) S's desire to prove his competence. Results show overpaid Ss produced more but lower quality work. Ss overpaid by circumstance did not differ from equitably paid Ss. Overpaid Ss scored higher on desire to prove competency than other Ss.

Lawler III, Koplin, and Young (1968) used public interviewing for three 2-hour periods, for which the Ss were paid on piece rate basis. IV : (1) Ss told they were qualified (equitably paid), or underqualified (overpaid) for task; (2) Ss' need for money earned. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality; (3) perceived qualifications. The results show that overpaid Ss produced less but higher quality work than equitably paid Ss in first period, but not next two. Instead,

their perceptions of their qualifications increased. Ss' need for money correlated with productivity among both overpaid and equitably paid.

Lawler III and O'Gara (1967) in their study used interviewing for 2 hours for which the subjects were paid on piece rate basis. IV : Ss underpaid or equitably paid. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality; (3) attitudes toward job. Results show that underpaid Ss produced more interviews, but of lower quality, and perceived job as more interesting but less complex, important, and challenging than equitably paid Ss.

Lerner (1965) made his female subjects listen to tape of 2 students working equally well at a joint anagram task. One worker was more attractive than other. IV : The attractive or less attractive worker paid \$ 3.50 for his work, the other paid nothing. DV : Ss' performance ratings of workers. The study came to the conclusion that Ss rated rewarded worker as having contributed more than the unrewarded worker. The ratings of work group contribution were lower and Ss were more uncomfortable when the less attractive worker was rewarded.

Lerner (1974) in another study conducted three experiments in which kindergarten, 1st, and 5th grade Ss performed manual tasks with fictitious partner as a team or individually. Ss then assumed supervisor role and allocated

rewards to selves and partners, or Ss simply determined own share. IV : (1) S produced more or less than partner; (2) team vs. individual instructions. DV : Reward allocation. Result show that kindergartners based allocation on equality rather than equity.

Leventhal (1972 a) presented a paper in which the S had to recommend pay increases for 4 hypothetical employees who had received outside job offer. IV : (1) High or low productivity of employees; (2) high or average attractiveness of outside offer working conditions and benefits; (3) instructions to Ss to make counter offers to weed out worst and retain all employees; or no instructions DV : Ss' recommendation for pay increases to each employee. Results of this study show that Ss offered high productivity workers more than low productivity workers and more when outside offer was highly attractive than when it was average. Difference between amount offered to high and low productivity workers was greater for Ss told to weed out worst and retain best than for Ss told to retain all.

Leventhal, Allen, and Kemelgor (1969) in a study made the S and partner (Confederate) perform arithmetic task for group pay of \$ 1.40 allocated by partner. S was then allowed to change allocation. IV : Amount allocated by partner to S : \$ 1.20, 95 ¢, 70 ¢, 45 ¢, 20 ¢, 5 ¢, or 2 ¢. DV : (1) S's changing allocation of reward; (2) S's tension

and anticipatory behaviour toward partner. Results of the study show that Ss receiving too much (too little) relative to their work inputs decreased (increased) their own rewards. Ss receiving 70 ¢ did not change allocation. Five Ss suffering extreme inequity (5 ¢ and 2 ¢ allocation) decreased their rewards. Ss' tension level increased as size of the inequity increased; Ss planned to compensate for inequity on future trials.

Leventhal and Anderson (1970) used preschool in their study who pasted stars with fictitious partner. IV : (1) Ss told their performance was superior, equal, or inferior to partners; (2) Ss' sex. DV : (1) Reward allocation; (2) Ss' reports of each member's performance. The analysis of result showed that the boys took more reward when their performance was superior than when it was equal to partner's. Girls did not. Neither boys nor girls in inferior performance conditions took less than half of reward, but both minimized partners' performance.

Lewenthal and Bergman (1969) used S and confederate who worked equally on arithmetic task. IV : (1) Confederate gave S 40 ¢ or 5 ¢ of \$ 1.40 reward after task; (2) Confederate sent S message with high or low status threat. DV : S's reallocation, either increasing or decreasing his reward upto 5¢. The results show that Ss awarded somewhat less than half of reward increased their share, whereas Ss awarded much less

decreased their share. Extreme unprofitable inequity increases self-depriving behaviour.

Leventhal and Lane (1970) made their subjects work with a fictitious partners on multiplication problems for which the paid received money. Ss allowed to divide earnings afterward. IV : (1) Ss told their performance was inferior or superior to partner's; (2) S's sex. DV : (1) Allocation of earnings; (2) perceptions of inputs. Results show that males allocated rewards equitably on the basis of performance. Females in superior performance condition took approximately half the reward; those with inferior performance took much less than half. Superior performance females tended to belittle their performance.

Leventhal and Michaels (1969) had their Ss work with confederates on jigsaw puzzles and then allocated rewards earned. IV : Ss required : (1) to work for longer or shorter duration than confederate, and (2) to complete smaller or greater quantity of work. DV : (1) Reward allocation; (2) perceptions of inputs. Result show that with amount of work constant, Ss was who worked longer look less reward than Ss who worked for shorter duration. When amount of work and duration were proportional for each member, Ss divided reward equally.

In another study Leventhal and Michaels (1971) had their subjects judge the extent to which 16 hypothetical

persons should be rewarded for performance in vertical jumps.

IV : Attributes of hypothetical persons : (1) high or low jump performance; (2) high or low effort; (3) tall and short body height; (4) useful and unuseful training. DV : How deserving of reward persons were. Results of the study show that with performance held constant, persons whose height and training helped them in jumping were rated as less deserving than those whose height and training did not help. Ss rated individuals with high effort as more deserving than those with low effort.

Leventhal, Michaels, and Sanford (1972) conducted two experiments where Ss allocated rewards to 4 hypothetical group members. IV : Group members varied as to (1) high or low performance and (2) high and low effort; (3) Ss instructed to allocate rewards in such a way as to prevent conflict among members, to prevent conflict between experimenters and members, to ignore possibility of conflict, or given instructions without reference to conflict (4) group members would know (no secrecy) or not know (secrecy) rewards other received. DV : Amount of reward to members. Results show that Ss gave higher rewards to better performers. They increased worst performer's share at expense of best under instructions to prevent conflict; inflation of worst performer's rewards was smaller under secrecy than no secrecy conditions. Ss' desire to conceal reward distribution was greatest in case of members given low reward.

In another two experiments conducted by Leventhal, Popp, and Sawyer (1973), children performed pegboard (or block) task and were rewarded. Ss were then asked to award picture seals to 2 fictitious children who had performed similar task, the results of which were shown. IV : (1) Small or large performance difference between 2 children; (2) allocate rewards as Ss thought best or as a teacher evaluating the results would think best; (3) Ss' Sex. DV : Reward allocation. The results indicate that Ss, specially boys, gave greater rewards to better performer when performance difference between children was large. Boys gave greater rewards to better performers when using own judgment than when expecting teacher to evaluate allocation.

Leventhal, Weiss, and Buttrick (1973) in two experiments designed is so that the Ss could reward with rolls of film or paperbacks 2 fictitious telephone interviewers who were equally good respondents. IV : (1) High or low previous purchase and use of film; (2) E stressed spoilage of unused film or omitted mention of this; (3) systematic variations in purchase and reading of books. DV : Reward allocation. Results show that interviewees more likely to be given film by S if they had used film at high rate in past and if S was in spoilage condition. S gave more books if interviewees had high past rate of usage, but only if past usage rate of interviewees was greatly different.

Leventhal, Weiss, and Long (1969) made their S and a fictitious partner proofread materials; partner then allocated \$ 2 reward. S then had opportunity to reallocate reward. IV : (1) Ss told that partner allocated reward intentionally or by chance; (2) S underrewarded (60 ¢) or overrewarded (\$ 1.40). DV : (1) Ss modification of the reward allocation; (2) responses to questionnaire. Results indicate that Ss overrewarded intentionally decreased their share of reward as more than Ss overrewarded by chance. Ss underrewarded by chance increased their reward to same extent as Ss underrewarded intentionally.

Leventhal and Whiteside (1973) made their Ss award mid-term grade to 8 hypothetical students whose exam performance was constant. IV : (1) High or low aptitude of students; (2) students, forewarned or not, were expected to perform at their best; (3) Ss instructed to grade fairly or to elicit highest possible future performance. DV : Grade allocation. The results showed that Ss gave higher grades to students with lower aptitude. This was more pronounced when Ss were trying to motivate high future performance and when students had been warned to do their best.

Leventhal, Younts, and Lund (1972) conducted two experiments in which household consumers were sold a cleaning product by E and then offered a rebate. IV : (1) Consumers told rebate was from salesman or from company; (2) consumers

told rebate was from salesman, from an individual supplier of the salesman, from a group of suppliers, or from the company. DV : Consumers' acceptance of rebate. The result showed that householders accepted rebate from company more than from others.

Libby and Garrett (1974) made 1st and 5th graders work on timed proofreading, believing that another child was doing same task in another room and that they would jointly receive 10 pennies for working. Partner divided 10 pennies, then S distributed 10 bonus pennies. IV : (1) Ss underrewarded (3 ¢) or overrewarded (7 ¢); (2) Ss told that the partner's allocation was intentional or chance; (3) school grade. DV : Ss allocation of 10 bonus pennies; (2) fairness and goodness ratings of partner. Results showed that overrewarded Ss split bonus in half with partners; underrewarded Ss awarded only 3 ¢ to partner. Neither intentionality nor grade had an effect on bonus division.

Lincoln and Levinger (1972) made Ss observe slides of white policeman and black civilian. IV : (1) Policeman in slides attacking civilian (aggression) or not (nonaggression); (2) Ss' ratings to be used only by E (no consequence) or by investigative inter racial commission (consequence). DV : (1) Ratings of perceived injustice; (2) rating of policeman and black civilian. Results show that in no-consequence condition, civilian rated lower under aggression than

nonaggression. Reverse results were obtained in consequence condition. In consequence condition, ratings of civilian positively correlated with perceived injustice.

Long and Lerner (1974) in their study had 4th grade Ss engaged to "market test" a game for which they were paid 70 ¢. They were then given opportunity to donate some of the pay to a child charity. IV : (1) Donation to charity would be known to no one, to E and teacher, or to future younger Ss; (2) overpaid or properly paid; (3) Ss' scores on delay of gratification test. DV : Donation to charity. Results showed that overpaid Ss donated more than properly paid Ss. Ss with high tolerance for delayed gratification gave more when overpaid and less when properly paid. No effect of who would know of donation.

In a study done by Marwell, Ratchiff, and Schmitt (1962) the authors made pairs of Ss play a 2-person game in 2-stage experiment. IV : (1) Games played in first stage produced inequity or equity between Ss; (2) sex of Ss. DV : Ss' noncooperation in the second stage of maximizing Difference Game. The results show that Ss behind their partners in first stage made more noncooperative responses than their "ahead" partners, thus minimizing the difference between players and increasing equity. This effect was stronger among females.

Masters (1969) used 4-to-5 year old Ss for the study

in which the Ss played a question game with younger partner for which they received reward-tokens. Then Ss replayed question game with E and divided rewards. IV : (1) Ss received fewer, the same number, or more reward tokens than partner; (s) Ss sex. DV : Number of reward tokens Ss gave to themselves when replaying game with E. The result showed Ss receiving fewer and girls receiving more tokens than partners took more tokens in the second game.

McArthur, Kiesler, and Cook (1969) made their subjects complete 2 "bogus" tasks after which the Ss received feedback and were promised pay for a future one-hour test. IV : (1) Low (\$ 1.50) or high (\$ 10) promised payment; (2) feedback to Ss : Had "doer" personality entitling them to payment, had "doer" personality, but entitled to payment because of task performance; or entitled to payment because of performance. DV : Ss' response to request by a second experimenter to pass out antipollution leaflets. Result showed that high payment Ss were more willing to pass out leaflets than low payment Ss. Ss told that they were paid for having "doer" personality were more willing to pass out leaflets than Ss in other feedback conditions.

In a study conducted by Messe' (1971) the investigator made the Ss first perform questionnaire task for varying lengths of time; they were then paired to bargain using Morgan-Sawyer bargaining board with 9 possible outcomes. Ss spending more time in pretask assigned high payoff side of board.

IV : Amount of time spent on questionnaire task, 0, 40, 50, 60, or 80 minutes. DV : Agreed-upon outcomes in bargaining. The result indicate that equity mediated the bargaining conflict. Ss agreed upon outcomes on the basis of amount of time spent on pretask.

In another study Messe', Dawson, and Lane (1973) used PD game bargaining as the task to be done by their subjects. IV : (1) Ss either worked for $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours on pre-bargaining task or did not; (2) low or high-reward PD matrix; (3) Ss told or not told how many PD trials they would play. DV : Amount of cooperation in PD game. The results show that Ss who worked on pretask made more cooperative responses in high-reward PD game than in low-reward game, resulting in more equitable payment. Ss who did not work on pretask made more cooperative responses in low-reward than high-reward game.

In a paper presented by Messe' and Lichtman (1972) the subjects had to do multiplication problems with a fictitious co-worker. IV : (1) Sex; (2) quality of S's performance, superior or inferior to co-worker; (3) S worked longer or shorter time than co-worker; (4) S recruited by promise of money or research credit. DV : S's reward allocation to himself and co-worker. Results show that the promise of research credit led to work quality as basis for ~~wx~~ rewarded allocation more than promise of money. Females allocated more to partners than to themselves.

Moore and Baron (1973) had their Ss proofread galleys for which they were paid on the basis of piece rate. IV : (1) "Standard", greater, or lesser pay; (2) Ss told they were qualified or unqualified for task. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) Work quality; (3) S's work attitudes. The results of the study show that the unqualified Ss produced higher quality but lower quantity than qualified Ss. Overpaid qualified Ss did poorer quality work than standard pay qualified Ss. No main effects of pay on productivity was observed. Unqualified Ss were found to be more dissatisfied than qualified Ss. Overcompensated Ss perceived the work as more important than undercompensated Ss.

Morgan and Sawyer (1967) using a game board, made 5th and 6th grade boys bargain for monetary rewards with partner. Possible rewards for each differed. IV : (1) Ss did or did not have information about partner's expectations; (2) partners were friends or non-friends. DV : (1) Duration of bargaining; (2) outcomes. Results show that Ss preferred equality of outcomes. Knowledge of partner's expectations facilitated bargaining.

Morris and Rosen (1973) made their Ss assume the role of a disabled person (arm in sling) and then perform manual task, and then told they could not meet quota. Later told electricity would be cut off, affecting help they could give to visually handicapped co-worker. IV : (1) Ss told they

performed well or poorly for manually handicapped person; (2) told it would be possible or impossible to help visually handicapped co-worker. DV : Ss help seeking from co-worker on first task. The conclusion reached was the Ss told they had performed poorly were less likely to seek help. Effects of opportunity to help co-worker later were mixed.

Nystrom (1973) used a computer simulation approach based on career salaries of 100 persons. The computer model finds support for Jaques' theory of equitable payment.

Pepitone (1971) conducted two experiments using pairs of Ss who played the PD game. IV : One of the 2 Ss were given \$ 2 bonus on the basis of merit test, given bonus arbitrarily, or given no bonus. DV : Ss' choices in PD Game. The results show that Ss made maximizing choices with a frequency such that equity was obtained.

Planz (1970) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation studied male teachers from selected schools who had in or left 2 school districts with differing reward structures. Results shows that stayers perceived a higher degree of equity than leavers. Above average performance was correlated with perceived equity.

Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (1972) used males Ss who worked on clerical task in simulated company for 7 half-days. IV : (1) Hourly or modified piece rate pay, pay mode reversed after 3 sessions; (3) equitable, over, or

underpayment. DV : (1) Performance; (2) job satisfaction. Results showed that overpayment and underpayment resulted in higher and lower performance, respectively. Over- and under-paid Ss were more dissatisfied than equitably paid Ss.

Radinsky (1969) made S and alleged other play a game with 2 possible responses, one of which resulted in "equitable" outcomes and other in unfavourable inequity outcomes. IV : (1) S given knowledge of own and other's outcomes or only of own outcomes; (2) S's sex. DV : Number of times each of 2 possible choices made. Results show that Ss responses in comparison and noncomparison conditions suggests that equity and inequity have reward and punishment effects, respectively. Female Ss more sensitive to equity-inequity than males.

Rosen and Jerdee (1974) made their Ss read one of 8 versions of a case describing a salesman who "padded" his expense account. Ss then recommended the most appropriate disciplinary action. IV : Padding was \$ 10-15 or \$ 80-100 monthly; (2) company paid among the highest or lowest commissions in the industry; (3) salesman's performance was 10% above or 10% below previous year's. DV : (1) Severity of recommended discipline; (2) perceived seriousness and unethicity of "padding"; (3) perceived responsibility for offense. Results show that discipline was less severe for salesman in low paying company than in high paying one. Perceived

seriousness and unethicallity of offence and the salesman's responsibility for it were lower in the low paying company.

Rothbart (1968) conducted 2 experiments in which the Ss acted as "supervisors" for a fictitious worker and they were to increase the latter's performance on letter-cancelling task by using threat of monetary punishment or promise of reward. E controlled information about worker performance. IV : (1) High (\$ 4) or low (nothing stated) motivation of supervisor; (2) Ss believed worker would receive only monetary rewards given by supervisor or \$ 2.50, regardless. DV : use of reward and punishment by S. Results show that Ss in high motivation condition used punishment more when they believed worker would receive \$ 2.50, when the earnings discrepancy between the two was least.

Schmitt and Marwell (1972) conducted three experiments, in which pairs of Ss worked on cooperative or individual tasks; rewards for cooperation greater than for individual work, but favourably inequitable. Withdrawal from cooperative to lower-paying individual task was the only alternative to cooperation. IV : (1) Large, moderate, or small inequity, (2) in moderate equity condition, Ss could either give money to or take money from each other. DV : (1) Amount of time spent cooperating; (2) transfer of money. Results indicate that withdrawal from cooperation was an increasing function of inequity. When allowed to transfer

rewards, most subjects transferred enough to produce equity or near equity.

Shapiro (1972) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation manipulated his Ss' inputs and social distance. Ss were then allowed to allocate rewards to themselves and a partner. It was seen that high input Ss allocated themselves more than half the reward, low input Ss less than half. High input Ss allocated more to themselves when social distance was high.

Simmons and Lerner (1968) conducted 2 experiments, in which they used female Ss supervisors whose pay depended on a fictitious partner who made checkerboards. In a second task, Ss were workers making envelopes. IV : (1) Ss had been rewarded or "betrayed" by the partner's high or low production of checkerboards or had worked independently (control); (2) Ss believed their supervisor in second task had been rewarded or betrayed on first task. DV : Envelopes made. Results show that previously rewarded Ss produced more for betrayed supervisors and least for rewarded supervisors.

Stephenson & White (1968) had as their Ss, English boys who played model racing car games, some racing, and some retrieving cars. They were then given opportunity to win prizes by cheating on a car racing quiz. IV : Ss raced cars whole time ("privileged"); raced and retrieved half the time ("equity"); retrieved only for adult racers ("relative

deprivation"); or retrieved only for other boys ("absolutely deprived"). DV : Cheating on quiz. Results show that cheating was greater among absolutely deprived and greater among the relatively deprived than among the equitably treated. Privileged Ss did not cheat less than equitably treated.

Taynor and Deaux (1973) had their male and female Ss read descriptions of male or female stimulus person behaving appropriately in civic emergency situation previously shown to be more masculine than feminine. Ss then rated stimulus persons. IV : (1) S's sex; (2) sex of stimulus person; (3) presence or absence in emergency situations of non-acting person whose sex was opposite to stimulus person's. DV : (1) How deserving of reward stimulus a person is; (2) ratings of stimulus person. Results show that female stimulus persons were perceived as deserving more reward than males in the same situation, and their ratings were correspondingly inflated.

Telly, French, and Scott (1971) made hourly employees in a high and low turnover shops in a large company respond to questionnaire about inequity pertaining to pay, supervision, leadmen, security, advancement, working conditions, and intrinsic and social aspects of the job. Inequity correlated with turnover.

Tarnow (1971) proposes that ambiguous job elements may be perceived by Ss as either inputs or outcomes. Based

on responses to a 120-item questionnaire, Ss who had previously participated in an equity experiment (vide supra Pritchard, Dunnette and Jorgenson, 1972) were classified as Type I (job elements perceived as inputs) and Type O (elements viewed as outcomes). The general findings are that perceptions of job elements improves the predictability of Ss' responses to over- and underreward. Underrewarded Type I Ss feel more underrewarded than underrewarded. Type O Ss and overrewarded Type I Ss feel less overrewarded than overrewarded Type O Ss.

Valenzi and Andrews (1971) hired their Ss on hourly pay rate for clerical work. IV : After working one session, Ss' pay was decreased (underpay), increased (overpay), or left the same (control). DV: (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. Results show no significant differences between the 3 pay conditions. 27% of underpaid Ss quit; no Ss quit in other pay conditions.

Wahba (1972) using a 3-person coalition formation task, preferences for 3 forms of equity were tested : (1) equality of outcomes, regardless of inputs; (2) proportionality of outcomes according to relative inputs; (3) equality of gains after repayment of inputs. Females preferred the first, males the third form.

Walster and Austin (1974) had their Ss, expecting normal \$ 2 pay, proofread pages, believing a second person

did similar task and that a supervisor would evaluate work and distribute \$ 4 between the 2 proofreaders. IV : (1) Having learned partner and he had performed equally well, S were led to expect equitable or inequitable payment; (2) S equitably, over- or underpaid. DV : Ss' contentment and distress as measured by Mood Adjective Check List before and after. Results show that equitably paid Ss were more content than underrewarded. Ss expecting inequity were less distressed with inequity than Ss expecting equity.

Weick (1964) lured the Ss and made them work for the experimenter for no credit evaluated their task more highly than Ss who worked for normal course credit, thus increasing their net total outcomes.

Wicker and Bushweiler (1970) had their Ss rate 18 2-person work situations. IV : (1) person liked or disliked a co-worker; (2) was more, less or equally valuable to employer as co-worker; (3) earned more, less, or the same as co-worker. DV : Ss' ratings of fairness and pleasantness of the situation. Results show that fairness related to the inputs and outcomes of workers. Pleasantness ratings related to liking of co-worker.

In another experiment they made female Ss and confederate work on oral-analogies test. IV : (1) Ss received more or less money than confederate; (2) Ss told they had made more or fewer correct responses than co-worker; (3) co-worker



made remarks to cause S to either like or dislike her. DV : Ss' ratings of the fairness and pleasantness of the situation. Results were same as above.

Wilke and Lanzetta (1970) had their Ss allocate trucks and railroad cars for shipping goods for 40 trials. Ss worked in pairs and believed they could help each other. IV : S was helped 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 times during the first 20 trials, 10 of which could be completed without help. DV : S's responses to partner's 10 requests for help in second block of 20 trials. Results show that help-giving was proportional to prior help received.

Wilke and Steur (1972) had Dutch Ss decode personality questionnaires for which they were paid on hourly basis. IV : (1) Ss told they had low, medium or high qualifications; (2) overpaid or equitably paid. DV : (1) Productivity; (2) work quality. Results show that overpaid and equitably paid Ss did not differ in productivity and work quality. Low qualified Ss produced more.

Wood and Lawler (1970) made their Ss read articles aloud for which they were paid on piece rate basis. IV : Ss told they were qualified or underqualified for task. DV : (1) Amount of time S read aloud; (2) quality as determined by Ss' Choice of difficult and easy articles to read. Results show that overpaid Ss produced less than equitably paid Ss. Lower productivity could not be attributed to striving for higher quality.

Wyer and Malinowski (1972) had pairs of Ss first participate in achievement task, then receive feed back on their performance, then interact in a series of 2-person game situations. IV : (1) same or different sex pairs; (2) negative or positive feed back on achievement task performance. DV : (1) S's response choices in 2-person games; (2) S's perception of partner as friendly and competitive. Results show that for pairs of same sex, Ss' response choices reduced inequities in outcomes.

 Tuchtman (1972) used questionnaires to measure reward distribution and work-role attractiveness of managers and workers in 26 Kibbutzim. Results show that managers received more intrinsic job satisfaction and power-related rewards but were less attracted to their jobs than workers. The findings are explained by equity theory.) 

Zedeck and Smith (1968) used an adaptation of the Method of Limits protocols which were administered to junior executives and secretaries in a large midwestern academic institution to determine perceived equitable payment and just meaningful difference of payment. Results of this study show that perceived equitable payment and just meaningful differences were greater for executives than secretaries.

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CHAPTER III

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METHOD AND PROCEDURE

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The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether, socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and anxiety variables influence the feeling of inequity. Inequity has been taken as the dependent variable while socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and anxiety, the independent variables. This leads to the measurement of subjects socio-economic level, the level of their emotional adjustment and the level of their anxiety.

The socio-economic level or status of the subject was measured by a scale developed by Jalota, Pandey, Kapoor and Singh (1970) known as the Socio-Economic status Scale Questionnaire (SESSQ-Urban) (Appendix I). The questionnaire of this scale seeks information about the following components :

1. Parental occupation.
2. Parental education and education of sisters and brothers.
3. Economic Index - income, house type, material possession.
4. Cultural level of the family as judged by expenditure on newspaper, magazine and material possessions.
5. Psychological indicators - as level of aspiration, concept of social prestige and beliefs in caste determining the tendency towards conservatism or progressivism.

Co-efficient of stability of this scale was calculated by test-retest method. The correlation of the scores of 50 subjects taken at two different times with an interval of one month was found to be .89.

The concurrent validity of this scale was also established by testing identifiable groups. When the scale was administered to students studying in La Martiniere College, Lucknow, where generally children from upper middle class go to study, it was noted that their mean score was far beyond the mean score for the whole sample, 66.31 for La Martiniere as against 36.86 of the original sample.

The norms have been provided by this scale. For the purpose of this study only the subjects falling in the lower strata (raw score-11-and below) and subjects falling in the upper strata (raw score-63-and above) were taken.

The emotional adjustment of the subjects was measured by the Aligarh Adjustment Inventory developed by A. Jamil Qadri (1964) and Guidance Unit of Department of Psychology, A.M.U. (Appendix II). The level of the inventory is for college and university students. Its main features deal with the following areas : social, emotional, health, family and financial. The total number of items in the inventory are 90. The reliability when calculated through the split-half method was .77 for social; .87 for emotional; .85 for health; .89 for family; and .87 for financial. With the

ratings based on clinical interviews the validity of this inventory was found to be .73. Norms have been provided for female as well as male students. For the purpose of this study only those subjects were taken who fell in the category of highly adjusted (raw score-0-20) and highly maladjusted (raw score-45-90).

The anxiety level of the subjects was measured by Sinha W.A. self-analysis Form (Anxiety Scale) developed by D.Sinha (1968) (Appendix III). As is obvious from the table given below, the test has high reliability. Standard error of measurement was found to be 6.10, indicating that the true score did not deviate too greatly from their true value.

METHOD	N	r	Index of Reliability	S.E.M.
Split-half	239	86	0.92	6.10
Test-retest	88	73	0.83	

The score on Taylor's MAS, as modified by the author was used as the first validation criterion. On 70 subjects who had taken the test, Taylor's MAS was administered. The correlation was found to be .69, which was of the same order as obtained on the unrevised version of the scale, and indicated that the two tests were measuring almost the same thing. The norms for this test have been provided for female as well

as male students. For the purpose of this study, subjects having (72, 63, 57, 48 scores - very high level of anxiety) and subjects having (18, 11, 1 scores - very low level of anxiety) were selected for the final experiment.

The final sample of this study consists of 80 undergraduate female students of Women's College, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The socio-economic status scale, the Aligarh Adjustment Inventory, and the Sinha W-A self-Analysis Form (Anxiety scale) were jointly administered to each of 430 female undergraduates of B.A., B.Sc., Ist, IIIrd and Vth semesters. The following breakup shows the number of students in each class and the final number chosen to participate in the inequity experiment.

CLASSES	SEMESTER	STUDENTS	NUMBER OF STUDENTS CHOSEN FOR THE EXPERIMENT
B.A.	I	85	15
B.A.	III	74	13
B.A.	V	68	16
B.Sc.	I	89	15
B.Sc.	III	59	11
B.Sc.	V	55	10
TOTAL		430	80

Each of the 80 subjects, in herself, combined the three characteristics of SEL, EA and Ax in various ways e.g. LSEL - LEA - LA (10 subjects); LSEL-LEA-HA (10 subjects); LSEL-HEA-LA (10 subjects); LSEL-HEA-HA (10 subjects); HSEL-LEA-LA (10 subjects); HSEL-LEA-HA (10 subjects); HSEL-HEA-LA (10 subjects); HSEL-HEA-HA (10 subjects).

The Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, as a Central Institution of learning attracts students from the whole country and may therefore, could be assumed to be a representative institution. The average age of the subjects was found to be 18.5 yrs.

To form the triads, the 80 subjects were randomly chosen and assigned a time to appear together for the experiment.

The subjects were tested by the experimenter and told that the experiment simulated conditions found in industry and business where people worked together.

They were read out the following instructions :
 "You three will work together on the same task, making a group. Your group will receive a monetary reward for the work. One of you would then be selected by lot to divide the reward or group earnings."

After receiving the preliminary instructions, they were asked to sit on the stools with the group reaction time

apparatus in front and given the following information :

"Thisⁱ_s a group reaction time apparatus which has measuring devices where I am sitting and individual panel at which you now sit. Each panel contains a stimulus light, and a reaction key, and they are so labelled. In each of the trials, the stimulus will consist of the onset of a white stimulus light on your panel. You are required to press your reaction key as quickly as you can after this light appears. Your reaction will be considered a success if and only if it occurs within a very short time interval after the onset of the white light. If you don't react within the interval, your reaction will be considered a failure and this will be indicated by the lighting of the red failure light on your panel. Each of you will be able to see your own and your partners failure lights."

The above description of the group reaction time apparatus was correct except that the appearance of the failure lights was controlled, independently of the subjects actual reactions, by the experimenter according to a fixed schedule. This schedule required that in the course of the experiment, one subject received 80% successful feedback, the second 50% successful feedback, and the third subject f | received 30% successful feedback, irrespective of their actual success or failure. The situation was, actually, manipulated by the experimenter in accordance with the preplanned objective of the experiment. After the termination of the

experiment the subjects were asked to record their names and percentage of correct responses of their partners and themselves on the sheet provided.

The subjects were again told that the three of them are partners, have worked on the same task and that their group will receive a monetary reward for its work, which one of them, by chance, will be chosen to divide between themselves.

Each subject was now dealt with separately. When they reported to the experimenter they were given the sheet on which they had recorded the percentage of correct response of their partners and themselves.

Then the experimenter told the subject that, as a group the three of them have earned Rs.6/- and that they can see each others contributions on the sheet given to them.

The subject was then given a printed form listing all possible divisions of the group earnings (Appendix IV). The subjects were asked to (✓) mark the one division in the space provided, which they thought most appropriate for each member, in terms of their group contributions.

After they had chosen a division, a 5-item questionnaire (Appendix V) was administered to the subjects. Subjects recorded their response to each item on a 7-point scale.

Then in a very brief post experimental interview they were requested not to talk about the experiment to other students as it would affect the results of the study, given Rs.2/- each, thanked for their co-operation and the session terminated. The above experimental procedure has been taken from the study conducted by Leventhal and Lane (1970) and the task performed by the subjects in this study is similar to that used by Cohen (1974).

The following hypotheses described in the Null-form were set up for the purpose of this study :

1. There is no effect of the level of Socio-economic status of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
2. There is no effect of the level of emotional adjustment of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
3. There is no effect of the level of anxiety of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
4. There is no effect of the level of socio-economic status coupled with level of emotional adjustment of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
5. There is no effect of the level of socio-economic status coupled with level of anxiety of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
6. There is no effect of the level of emotional adjustment

coupled with level of anxiety of a subject on the feeling of inequity.

7. There is no effect of the level of socio-economic status coupled with level of emotional adjustment and anxiety of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
8. There is no effect of LSEL coupled with LEA and LA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
9. There is no effect of LSEL coupled with LEA and HA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
10. There is no effect of LSEL coupled with HEA and LA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
11. There is no effect of LSEL coupled with HEA and HA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
12. There is no effect of HSEL coupled with LEA and LA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
13. There is no effect of HSEL coupled with LEA and HA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
14. There is no effect of HSEL coupledw with HEA and LA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.
15. There is no effect of HSEL coupled with HEA and HA of a subject on the feeling of inequity.

ANALYSIS

As has been pointed earlier, the object of this study was to test the effect of socio-economic level, level of emotional adjustment and level of anxiety on inequity. The three independent variables - socio-economic level (A); Emotional adjustment (B); and Anxiety (C) were each dichotomised as high and low (A_2, A_1 ; B_2, B_1 ; C_2, C_1).

The three independent variables were each divided into two levels - a higher total score level and a lower total score level. This was done by the help of norms provided in the three tests.

Thus, eight groups were obtained each consisting of 10 subjects :

1. Low socio-economic level, low emotional adjustment and low anxiety (LSEL-LEA-LA).
2. Low socio-economic level, low emotional adjustment and high anxiety (LSEL-LEA-HA).
3. Low socio-economic level, high emotional adjustment and low anxiety (LSEL-HEA-LA).
4. Low socio-economic level, high emotional adjustment and high anxiety (LSEL-HEA-HA).

5. High socio-economic level, low emotional adjustment and low anxiety (HSEL-LEA-LA).
6. High socio-economic level, low emotional adjustment and high anxiety (HSEL-LEA-HA).
7. High socio-economic level, high emotional adjustment and low anxiety (HSEL-HEA-LA).
8. High socio-economic level, high emotional adjustment and high anxiety (HSEL-HEA-HA).

In order to determine whether inequity was in some way affected by the independent variable singly or by their various possible combinations of the eight groups thus formed, these had to be analysed for the significance of the difference between their means collectively and with various possible combinations. This was possible by applying the analysis of variance.

Analysis of variance is a statistical tool developed by Sir R.A.Fisher and his associates. Its basic purpose is to test the significance of difference between two or more means. The requirement of this study goes further - it is also desired to know how these means differ. Edwards (1960) points out "a variety of methods have been proposed for investigating the differences existing between a set of K means. These tests are useful whenever we are concerned with multiple comparisons among the means." He adds, "In

making multiple comparisons among the treatment means, it is not necessary that the treatment mean square of the analysis of variance be significant."

In this study there being three factors (socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and level of anxiety) each with two levels (high and low) a 2x2x2 factorial design was applied (Edwards, 1960; McGuigan, 1960).

The following steps are used in conducting an analysis of variance for the 2x2x2 factorial design:


To begin the analysis, we first find the total sum of squares, then the treatment sum of Squares and then the within treatment sum of Squares. The present investigation has three factors A, B, and C, each varied in two way A_1, A_2 ; B_1, B_2 ; and C_1, C_2 . The total number of observations is 80, 10 in each of the subdivided groups of the three main factors, A, B, and C.

The three sums of squares (Ss) are calculated as follows :

$$\text{Total Ss} = (x_1)^2 + (x_2)^2 + (x_3)^2 + \dots + (x_{79})^2 + (x_{80})^2 - \frac{(\sum x_1 + \sum x_2 + \dots + \sum x_7 + \sum x_8)^2}{N}$$

$$\text{Treatment Ss} = \frac{(\sum x_1)^2}{n} + \frac{(\sum x_2)^2}{n} + \dots + \frac{(\sum x_7)^2}{n} + \frac{(\sum x_8)^2}{n} - \frac{(\sum x_1 + \sum x_2 + \dots + \sum x_7 + \sum x_8)^2}{N}$$

$$\text{Within Ss} = \text{Total Ss} - \text{Treatment Ss}$$



After the sums of Squares (Ss) have been calculated we have to calculate the mean squares for all the three factors, A, B, and C. These means squares for the levels of factors are often called the Main Effects.

Each of the factors or components A, B, and C will represent a comparison between the two levels of a given factor. To calculate the Main Effects of Variable or factor A, we have the first comparison of Variable A. We find the sum for :

$$A_1 = X_1 + X_2 + X_3 + X_4 =$$

$$A_2 = X_5 + X_6 + X_7 + X_8 =$$

For the second comparison of variable B, we find the sum for :

$$B_1 = X_1 + X_2 + X_5 + X_6 =$$

$$B_2 = X_3 + X_4 + X_7 + X_8 =$$

For the third comparison of variable C, we find the sum for :

$$C_1 = X_1 + X_3 + X_5 + X_7 =$$

$$C_2 = X_2 + X_4 + X_6 + X_8 =$$

Then we substitute the above values calculated to the following formula, to find out the Main Effects^{of} all the three variables, A, B, and C.

$$A = \frac{(\sum X_{A_1})^2}{n} + \frac{(\sum X_{A_2})^2}{n} - \frac{(\sum X_1 + \sum X_2 + \dots + \sum X_7 + \sum X_8)^2}{N}$$

Using the above formula, likewise the values of variable B and C are also substituted and the Main Effects calculated of the three variables.

In addition, to the calculation of Main Effects or Mean Squares for the three variables, we have to calculate for the Interaction between the three factors.

A Two-way Table for computing an Interaction is shown Schematically represented for interaction of factors A, B, and C, designated A X B, A X C and B X C.

Two-way Table for A X B :

	B ₁	B ₂	Σ
A ₁	a	b	
A ₂	c	d	
Σ			

Where a = the sum for A₁B₁=

b = the sum for A₁B₂=

c = the sum for A₂B₁=

d = the sum for A₂B₂=

Similarly, a Two-way Table for A X C :

	C_1	C_2	Σ
A_1	a	b	
A_2	c	d	
Σ			

And, a Two-way Table for B X C :

	C_1	C_2	Σ
B_1	a	b	
B_2	c	d	
Σ			

and the values for a, b, c, and d are calculated for A X C and B X C as shown for A X B.

After the Two-way Tables have been constructed for A X B, A X C, and B X C and their respective values incorporated, we calculate the interaction for A X B, A X C, and B X C by the following formula :

$$\text{Interaction} = \frac{\sum (a + d) - (b + c) \overline{T}^2}{4n}$$

After computing interaction sum of squares for

factors A X B, A X C, and B X C by the above method, we can calculate the interaction sum of Squares for A X B X C.

To calculate the A X B X C interaction we see our Treatment Ss which is equal to the sum of squares for A, B, C, A X B, A X C, B X C, and A X B X C. Because, we have already calculated all of these sums of squares, except A X B X C, the latter can be obtained by subtracting the other six sums of squares from the Treatment Ss.

The value of F for all the three factors, A, B, and C and their interactions A X B, A X C, B X C, and A X B X C, are obtained by dividing each of the Mean Squares that is to be tested for significance by the error mean, that is, the within treatment mean square. The within treatment mean square is obtained by dividing the within Ss by the d.f. of within treatments.

In analysis of variance the degree of freedom has been partitioned into two parts. One part is associated with difference among the eight treatment means and is based on $K - 1 = 7$ d.f. The other part is associated with the variation and has $K (n - 1) = 72$ d.f.

After the application of F test the EA variable of the present investigation was found to be significant. As EA is dichotomised in HEA and LEA, the t test was then applied to determine whether one level of EA was superior to the other.

The following formula was applied to determine the t value :

$$t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{S \sqrt{\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}}} \dots\dots(\text{McGuigan, 1960})$$

$$\text{Where } S = \sqrt{\frac{x_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{x_2^2}{n_2} - 2}$$

The d.f. for t test is calculated, as follows :

$$\text{d.f.} = n_1 + n_2 - 2$$

The dichotomised group having the higher mean value, is taken to be the superior of the two.

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CHAPTER IV

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DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS

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Equity theory (Adams, 1965) states that person tend to maintain proportionality between their inputs and outcomes and the inputs and outcomes of a comparison other. Consequently, equity theory proposes that persons who allocate rewards within a group distribute them in proportion to each member's contributions. While this proposition has been supported by a number of studies, other studies have failed to support equity indicating that rewards are distributed equally.

Studies supporting equity over equality have been conducted by Leventhal and his associates (Leventhal and Anderson, 1970, Leventhal and Lane, 1970, Leventhal and Michaels, 1969). In these studies where members of a dyad made unequal work contributions, subjects allocated the reward unequally. In contrast to these studies supporting equity over equality, there are studies (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967, Wiggins, 1966) coalition studies (reviewed by Gansson, 1964) which indicate contrary to equity, that even when inputs are unequal, subjects do allocate rewards equally.

These conflicting results can be understood by reference to situational and social factors which differed across these studies. Equity or inequity basically is a social concept as can very well be construed in the definition

given by Adams (1963). It is only the social, cultural and psychological factors which induce the feelings of inequity or equity. These factors along with the value systems, stage of economic development, state of employment, remunerations or pay grades and the general price level prevalent in a country at a particular point of time are all important factors to be taken into consideration as far as feelings of inequity are concerned. Man is not only a rational animal but also an emotional being. Human behaviour, particularly social human behaviour is a global concept and is therefore, determined by a large number of factors relevant, rationally and emotionally, to a given situation including a host of contingent factors.

The purpose of the present study is to see how socio-economic status, level of emotional adjustment and level of anxiety affect the reward allocation and the subsequent feelings of equity or inequity of co-workers with unequal inputs in a triad.

To start with, it may be pointed out that the subjects of the present study while allocating rewards, irrespective of their inputs or performance, socio-economic status, emotional adjustment levels and their levels of anxiety divided it in 36.25% of cases according to the equity theory. 68.75% of the subjects in the present

investigation divided the reward, irrespective of their performance or their partner's, equally (c.f. Table 1.1).

TABLE 1.1

OVER ALL PERCENTAGE OF REWARD ALLOCATION RESPONSE BY THE
SUBJECTS

TYPE OF ALLOCATION	PERCENTAGE OF REWARD ALLOCATION
Equity	36.25 %
Equality	63.75 %

Note : Number of subjects = 80 .

This broad and simple finding clearly shows the inadequacy of the various assumptions of distributive justice as advanced for the various formulations of equity theory, mentioned earlier in this discussion.

The notion that equality might be preferred to equity is, in fact, suggested by Adams (1965) in discussing exchanges other than with an employer. He stated "in a vast array of social relations reciprocity is a functional element of the relation. What is, in fact, referred to by reciprocity is equality of exchange (p.278)". However, Adams does not discuss why equality should be the rule in direct exchanges.

When the quality of performance of the subjects is

considered, we find that out of the total number of subjects (80), 27 subjects with 30% input or performance level, 7 subjects divided the reward according to the equity principle and 20 according to the equality principle. Likewise, 26 subjects with 50% level of performance 19 subjects divided the reward on equity basis and 7 subjects divided the reward equally. Similarly, 27 subjects with 80% performance level, 4 subjects divided the reward according to equity principle and 24 subjects divided the reward equally (c.f. Table 1.2).

TABLE 1.2

OVERALL REWARD ALLOCATION RESPONSE OF SUBJECT'S AS A
FUNCTION OF PERFORMANCE.

TOTAL NUMBER OF SUBJECTS	LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE	NO. OF SUBJECTS DIVIDING REWARD ON THE BASIS OF	
		EQUITY	EQUALITY
27	30%	7	20
26	50%	19	7
27	80%	3	24

Before we proceed with the explanation of our results, let^{us} discuss a peculiarity in Table 1.2. While a majority of subjects with 30% and 80% level of performance or input divided the reward equally, why did 19 out of 26 subjects with 50% level of performance prefer to divide the reward on the equity basis ? These subjects seem to exhibit

a greater concern for the principles of distributive justice than the subjects with either a very high or low level of input (80% and 30% respectively). A likely explanation could be that subjects with an average level of input (50%) neither felt guilty at contributing less to the group earnings nor felt over generous for contributing quite highly to the group earnings, and as such preferred to follow the principles of equity over equality.

In planning the present study personality factors like emotional adjustment and anxiety have been kept in mind. Most of the investigations of equity behaviour have studied the effect of such social and environmental factors as performance, socio-economic status, social facilitation, factors in small group dynamics, expectations, liking etc., neglecting almost completely personality factors which are being studied by the present investigator. It is obvious that social factors have a pretty good effect on behaviour in groups, yet personality factors do influence social behaviour by themselves as well as in conjunction with a host of situational factors.

Although the application of the F test on the data obtained by the 5-item questionnaire has shown level of socio-economic status and level of anxiety as insignificant as will be clear while we proceed further with our analyses, yet we can very well see in Table 1.3 how different combinations of socio-economic status, level of emotional adjustment with

level of anxiety result in giving tremendous shift to the basis of reward allocation on the part of our subjects.

TABLE 1.3

PERCENTAGE OF REWARD ALLOCATION RESPONSE OF THE TRIADS ON
THE BASIS OF ~~EQUALITY~~^{EQUITY} AND EQUITY.

TRIADS	TYPES OF ALLOCATION	PERCENTAGE OF REWARD ALLOCATION
LSEL - LEA - LA	Equality Equity	90% 10%
LSEL - LEA - HA	Equality Equity	100% 0%
LSEL - HEA - LA	Equality Equity	20% 80%
LSEL - HEA - HA	Equality Equity	60% 40%
HSEL - LEA - HA	Equality Equity	70% 30%
HSEL - LEA - LA	Equality Equity	90% 10%
HSEL - HEA - LA	Equality Equity	0% 100%
HSEL - HEA - HA	Equality Equity	60% 40%

Note : N in each cell \pm 10.

Table 1.3 shows that when subjects with LSEL-LEA-LA allocated rewards, 90% of them allocated in accordance with equality norm and 10% of them adhered to the equity norm, subjects with LSEL-LEA-HA distributed the rewards on the basis of the equality norm in 100% of cases, none of the subjects in this group divided the reward on the basis of equity principle. The two groups have the same SEL (low) and same EA (low) but differed only in their level of anxiety. The data obtained points out clearly that low anxiety has a slight effect on the subjects, because 10% of them have shown a concern for the principles of equity, but the percentage is too small to be of much consequence. But in the next group we see, subjects with LSEL-LEA-HA have divided the reward only on the basis of equality principle, completely disregarding the equity norm. This points out clearly that though low anxiety level had an effect, it was very slight, the subjects were more influenced with their low-socio-economic status, low emotional adjustment and high anxiety, therefore more concerned with the social reactions of other members of the peer group^{to} which they belong. They also seem to be perhaps more concerned with self-image building and ego-defence and therefore, wanting to project a favourable image of themselves, thus, dividing the reward on the basis of the equality principle and completely overlooking the equity principle.

Here we can see that over hypotheses Nos. 8 and 9 have been rejected.

Let us take the next two groups in Table 1.3, namely LSEL-HEA-LA and LSEL-HEA-HA. We see that these groups are dissimilar than the first two above discussed groups in having high emotional adjustment (HEA) of the subjects. The data obtained points out clearly that subjects with high emotional adjustment have shown a much greater concern for the principle of 'distributive justice' and allocated rewards according to the equity norm. The group having LSEL-HEA-LA have divided the reward in 20% of cases equally and in 80% of cases on equity basis. In the LSEL-HEA-HA group, the subjects have divided the reward in 60% of cases according to equality and in 40% of cases according to the equity principle. In the later group, we see that HEA did exert considerable influence on the reward allocation behaviour, but it could not be too much as the subjects were more highly influenced by their LSEL and HA. Whereas in the former group the effect of LSEL was comparatively less because the subjects had HEA and LA, thus giving them the impetus to divide the reward in 80% of cases according to the equity principle. It can be said that subjects with high emotional adjustment and low anxiety level seem, obviously, to be less concerned with the social reactions of other members of the peer group to which they belong. They also seem to be, perhaps, much less concerned with image building and ego-defence and therefore, more objective in their reward allocation behaviour in which inputs/outputs determine the basis on which rewards are distributed (equity).

The hypotheses nos. 10 and 11 are rejected on the basis of the above explanations.

Coming to the triads in the HSEL-LEA-LA group, the co-workers allocated rewards in 70% of cases according to the equality norm and followed the equity norm in 30% of cases. In the next group of triads, HSEL-LEA-HAŞ we see that the co-workers have divided the reward in 90% of cases according to the equality principle and only in 10% of cases according to the equity norm. Here we find that high-socio-economic level and low-emotional adjustment are common to both the groups, they only differ in their level of anxiety. In the former group the security generated by high-socio-economic status and the low level of anxiety has given the subjects the impetus to divide the reward in 30% of cases according to the principles of 'distributive justice'. The 70% of the times when this group has preferred to divide the reward according to the equality principle can be understood as the effect of low emotional adjustment which made them concerned with the social reactions of other members of the peer group to which they belonged and the effect of altruistic principle. The high socio-economic status of the subjects made them project a social image in consonance with the reputation and prestige usually enjoyed and projected by persons belonging to high socio-economic status. In the later group the low level of emotional adjustment, high anxiety and the effect of altruistic principle made the triads of this group,

HSEL-LEA-HA, divide the reward in 90% of cases according to the equality principle. Still 10% of the subjects of this group have allocated the reward according to the equity principle, this can be explained in terms of a slight effect of the feeling of security generated by the high socio-economic status but it was not so strong as to overcome the effect of the other two negative variables, namely LEA and HA.

Here again we see that our hypotheses nos. 12 and 13 have been rejected.

The analysis of the next triads show a drastic shift in their reward allocation response. The triad with HSEL-HEA-LA, a group coming from a high socio-economic status, having high emotional adjustment and low level of anxiety, all plus points, are shown clearly in their division of the reward. This group has in 100% of cases divided the reward according to the equity principle, showing a complete disregard for the principle of equal distribution. This group seems to be least concerned about projecting a favourable self-image, show no problems of social interaction; they do not feel that their self-esteem and their position in the peer group will be threatened. They seem to have made themselves the chums of the peer group and as such have just considered the principle of 'distributive justice' or equity as the sole criteria of dividing the reward. But we see a difference in the reward allocation of the next group of

triads. Here we have HSEL-HEA-HA, the co-workers have followed the equality principle in 60% of cases and the equity norm in 40% of cases. This group's high level of anxiety and their subsequent need to project an altruistic attitude to go with their high socio-economic status made them divide the reward in 60% of cases according to the equality principle, though high emotional adjustment has led them to allocate the reward in at least 40% of cases according to the equity norm.

The Hypotheses nos.14 and 15 have been rejected.

Table 1.4 shows how the three independent variables, namely socio-economic status, emotional adjustment and anxiety, influenced the reward allocation behaviour in conjunction with the level of performance of the subjects. The most outstanding feature of this analysis is that the superior performers (80% level of performance) of all possible combinations of the independent variable except the HSEL-HEA-LA group have divided the reward according to the equality principle. A study conducted by Leventhal and Lane (1970) using preschoolers male and female subjects have also come to similar conclusions, that females and specially superior performers tended to follow the equality norm in their reward allocation response. The reason for the inability of the HSEL-HEA-LA group to follow the equality norm has been discussed earlier (c.f. page 92).

TABLE 1.4

TYPE OF REWARD ALLOCATION BY THE TRIADS ON THE BASIS OF
PERFORMANCE.

TRIADS	LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE	NO. OF SUBJECTS	TYPE OF ALLOCATION	
			EQUITY	EQUALITY
LSEL-LEA-LA	30%	2	-	3
	50%	3	1	2
	80%	4	-	4
LSEL-LEA-HA	30%	3	-	3
	50%	4	-	4
	80%	3	-	3
LSEL-HEA-LA	30%	4	4	-
	50%	3	3	-
	80%	3	1	2
LSEL-HEA-HA	30%	3	-	3
	50%	3	3	-
	80%	4	-	4
HSEL-LEA-LA	30%	3	-	3
	50%	3	2	1
	80%	4	-	4
HSEL-LEA-HA	30%	3	-	3
	50%	4	1	3
	80%	3	-	3
HSEL-HEA-LA	30%	4	4	-
	50%	3	3	-
	80%	3	3	-
HSEL-HEA-HA	30%	3	1	2
	50%	4	3	1
	80%	3	-	3

Note : N in each cell = 10

After the subjects had distributed the rewards they were given a 5-item questionnaire. Subjects recorded their response to each item on a 7-point rating scale consisting of a row of 61 divisions which allowed them to respond in tenths of a unit. The actual performance of the subjects shows that they did not respond to the finer divisions within a unit but responded in terms of whole units i.e. from 0 to 6 on the 7-point scale. Responses to this questionnaire were subjected to the F test of variance, the result of which ~~are~~ tabulated in Table 2.1. Variable emotional adjustment (B) was found to be significant on the II, III and IV items of the questionnaire, which necessitated the running of t-test through these responses only. Results of running the t-test on the responses to the three questions regarding variable B are given in Table 2.2. The F test has also shown that there is no significant interaction between the three variables, A, B and C, which is also given in Table 2.1.

Responses to the 5-item questionnaire help the investigator in identifying the norms of distribution followed by a given subject, e.g., a subject responding to question I may tick mark at 6 (greatly) showing that she had greatly taken account of performance while dividing the reward. It may mean any of the three alternatives that the subject was greatly concerned with her own performance or that of her partner or that of both of them. Again it may mean that the

TABLE 2.1

OVERALL VALUE OF F FOR THE RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
AS A FUNCTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL, EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT,
AND ANXIETY.

ITEMS	VARIABLES						
	A	B	C	AxB	AxC	BxC	AxBxC
1. Did you take account of performance when dividing the reward?	2.78	-	2.43	-	1.04	1.04	-
2. How did your per- formance compare to that of your partners ?	-	4.61 [*]	-	-	1.42	-	-
3. Was quality of your work similar to that of your partners ?	-	8.57 ⁺	-	-	-	2.05	2.43
4. Would you like to have the same partners in a further study ?	-	4.88 [*]	-	-	-	-	-
5. Did you consider the effect of your division of the reward on your partner's opinion of you ?	-	-	2.33	-	-	-	-

* significant at .05 level.

+ significant at .01 level.

poor performance of her partner was taken into consideration
or her own poor performance might have been taken into consi-
deration, depending on how the two partners actually performed.

How on the basis of this consideration, the reward was actually distributed shows the norms governing the reward allocation behaviour of the allocators. It is right here that a proper account has to be taken of the other variables like socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and level of anxiety and such other factors. The present investigation takes into consideration only the three variables, namely, socio-economic level, emotional adjustment and anxiety (SEL, EA and AX, respectively), an analysis of the data that has been done in the previous pages and also the analysis that follows has mainly been focussed around these three variables.

Table 2.1 gives the values of F on variables A, B and C i.e. socio-economic level or status, emotional adjustment and anxiety respectively. On item I the value of F for variable A, B and C and their interaction has been found to be insignificant. It means that these variables did not influence the subjects to take into consideration the performance of their partners and their own input while allocating the reward. This result can be seen in the subjects allocation behaviour where 63.75% of them have preferred the equality norm to the equity norm. Had they preferred the equity norm, level of performance of their partner's and themselves would have been the criteria to divide the reward.

The II and III items measured the subjects assessment of inputs, analysing the item II of the

questionnaire, we find that the F values of variable B is (4.61 > .05) whereas the interaction of these three variables was found to be insignificant. The F values of variable A and C was also found to be insignificant for item II. Here we see that subjects with either high or low emotional adjustment engaged in cognitive distortion to reduce the inequity created by their failure to take more reward for themselves. Application of t-test will show ^{which} level of emotional adjustment indulged in this cognitive distortion.

Similarly item III of the questionnaire shows the F values of A and C to be insignificant, while variable B is significant (8.57 > .01) here the subjects judged their work to be significantly more similar to that of their partners, although the interaction of the three variables was insignificant. This result indicates that subjects with either high or low level of emotional adjustment did not exaggerate the difference between their own inputs and those of their partners. Such cognitive distortion would have led them to take a very small share of reward, and as such they preferred to divide it in majority of cases equally. One reason such distortion did not occur may be that the subjects were reluctant to underestimate their inputs because their self-esteem would have been threatened (Adams, 1965; Leventhal and Anderson, 1970).

Analysis of item IV shows that the F values of

variable A and C were insignificant but the variable B was significant ($4.88 > .05$), thereby, indicating that subjects with high or low level of emotional adjustment were attracted towards their partners and would not mind them as future partners in another study. The interaction effect of these three variables was insignificant.

On item V and F values of all the three variables and their interaction was found to be insignificant. This indicates that the subjects had not taken into consideration their partners opinion on their division of reward. Had the subjects been dividing rewards according to the norm of 'distributive justice' they would have been much more concerned with their partner's opinion of them.

The overall findings of this study suggests that as the subjects belonged to the same college fraternity, their allocation decisions were influenced by the equality norm. The equality norm was followed by the allocator because it fosters harmony and solidarity (Bales, 1950) also equal distribution tends to produce a high level of satisfaction and harmony among group members (e.g. Julian and Perry, 1967; Smith and Cook, 1973, Steiner, 1972). The results of the present study indicate that in certain type of social setting equality norm influences the allocator's decisions, and is similar to the results obtained by Garrett, 1973, Kahn, 1972; Lane and Coon, 1972; Leventhal, Popp and

Sawyer, 1978; Lichtman, 1972; Pruitt, 1972; Sampson, 1969; Lerner, 1974a. The equality norm is specially followed in settings where it is widely regarded as the most appropriate rule of allocation and others expect the allocator to follow it.

This study dealt only with female college students as subjects, and reached the conclusion that majority of the subjects preferred the equality norm even when the inputs of the co-workers of the triad was different or regardless of initial differences in contributions. Vinacke and his associates (Bond and Vinacke, 1961; Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963; Vinacke, 1962) also found that females partners tended to follow the equality norm more than the male partners. They accounted for these results by suggesting that female groups prefer equality because they are more concerned than males about preserving harmony and solidarity.

The F values of three out of the 5-questionnaire items being significant on variable B, the next necessary step was that of running the t in order to find out which of the two levels (high (B_2) or low (B_1)) was influencing the reward allocation behaviour of our subjects in a statistically significant manner. Table 2.2 give the mean scale values of responses for groups B_2 and B_1 and the value of t for each item of the questionnaire.

TABLE 2.2

MEAN SCALE VALUE AND t-VALUE OF THE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE
ITEMS AS A FUNCTION OF HIGH - LOW EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENT LEVEL
($B_2 + B_1$)

ITEMS	MEAN SCALE VALUE		t - VALUE
	B_2	B_1	
1. Did you take account of performance when dividing the reward?	3.42	3.56	0.93
2. How did your performance compare to that of your partner?	3.53	4.43	2.30*
3. Was quality of your work similar to that of your partners ?	3.35	4.53	4.76+
4. Would you like to have the same partner in a further study ?	3.30	4.30	2.33*
5. Did you consider the effect of your division of the reward on your partner's opinion of you ?	3.65	4.0	0.96

* Significant at .05 level.

+ Significant at .01 level.

The value of t on item I and V were found to be insignificant. Now let us consider the t values of items II and III, both of which measure { subjects assessment of inputs. On item II the t value is ($2.30 > .05$) which is significant. The mean scale value of B_1 is 4.43 which is

greater than the mean scale value of B_2 , 3.53. The data indicate that subjects with low emotional adjustment engaged in cognitive distortion to reduce the inequity created by their failure to follow the equity principle, thus taking less reward for themselves if their performance was superior or taking more reward for inferior performance because they followed the equality norm instead of the equity norm.

On item III the t value is ($4.76 > .01$) which is significant and the mean scale value of B_1 is greater than that of B_2 (4.53 and 3.35 respectively). This result indicates that the low emotional adjustment subjects did not exaggerate the difference between their own inputs and that of their partners. The explanation given earlier (c.f. 98) holds good here too.

The t value of item IV was also significant ($2.33 > .05$) and the mean scale value of B_1 was greater than that of B_2 (4.30 and 3.30) respectively) subjects with low emotional adjustment felt more attracted towards their partners. One reason for their preference for the same partners in a further study could be that having divided the reward equally they felt that they will be easily acceptable to their partners in future as they had not generated antagonism and tension by allocating the rewards on the basis of merit or on the basis of equity norm.

This discussion leads us to conclude with the rejection of hypothesis no.2 and acceptance of hypotheses no.1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

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CHAPTER V

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CONCLUSIONS

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The conclusions arrived on the basis of the findings of the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects of this study are as follows :

1. 63.75% of the total subjects allocated the rewards according to the equality norm and 36.25% according to the equity norm.
2. (a) Out of 27 subjects with 30% level of performance, 7 subjects allocated the reward according to equity norm and 20 subjects according to the equality norm.

(b) Out of the 26 subjects with 50% level of performance, 19 subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm and 7 subjects according to the equality norm.

(c) Out of the 27 subjects with 80% level of performance, 3 subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm and 24 subjects according to the equality norm.
3. (a) 90% of the LSEL - LEA - LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.

(b) 10% of the LSEL-LEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.

- (c) 100% of the LSEL-LEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (d) 0% of the LSEL-LEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.
- (e) 20% of the LSEL-HEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (f) 80% of the LSEL-HEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.
- (g) 60% of the LSEL-HEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (h) 40% of the LSEL-HEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.
- (i) 70% of the HSEL-LEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (j) 30% of the HSEL-LEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.
- (k) 90% of the HSEL-LEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (l) 10% of the HSEL-LEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.

- (m) 0% of the HSEL-HEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (n) 100% of the HSEL-HEA-LA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.
- (o) 60% of the HSEL-HEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equality norm.
- (p) 40% of the HSEL-HEA-HA subjects allocated the reward according to the equity norm.

The 5-item questionnaire was administered in ~~our~~ order to find out, to what extent performance or input/output ratio, as proposed by Adams (1963) and others in defining inequity and explaining principles of 'distributive justice', actually influenced the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects of this study. Although on only 3 out of the 5-items, the findings are significant, yet it is obvious, as explained in the analysis of these and other findings, that in most of the cases principles or norms, other than the norms of 'distributive ~~in~~ justice' were governing the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects of this study.

The findings on the 5-item questionnaire are as follows :

Item - 1.

- (a) SEL did not influence the reward allocation behaviour

of our subjects in taking performance into consideration,
($F = 2.78$, $p < .05$).

- (b) EA did not influence the reward allocation behaviour, in taking performance into account.
- (c) AX did not influence the reward allocation behaviour in taking account of performance, ($F = 2.43$, $p < .05$).
- (d) The interaction effect of AXB, AXC, BXC, and AXBXC did not influence the division of reward in taking account of performance.

Item - 2.

- (a) SEL did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects in comparing their own performance with that of their partners.
- (b) EA influenced the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in comparing their own performance with that of their partners, ($F = 4.61$, $p > .05$).
- (c) AX did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects in comparing their own performance with that of their partners.
- (d) The interaction effect of AXB, AXC, BXC and AXBXC did not influence the subjects, in comparing their own performance with what of their partners.

Item - 3.

- (a) SEL did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in taking into account the quality of their performance and that of their partners.
- (b) EA influenced the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in taking account of the quality of their performance and that of their partners, ($F=8.57$, $p > .01$).
- (c) AX did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects in taking account of the quality of their performance and that of their partners.
- (d) The inter action effect of AXB, AXC, BXC and AXBXC did not influence the subjects, in taking into account the quality of their performance and that of their partners.

Item - 4.

- (a) SEL did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in wanting to have the same partners in a further study of this type.
- (b) EA influenced the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in wanting to have the same partners in a further study of this type, ($F = 4.88$, $p > .05$).
- (c) AX did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in wanting to have the same partners in a further study of this type.

- (d) The interaction effect of AXB, AXC, BXC and AXBXC did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in wanting to have the same partners in a further study of this type.

Item - 5.

- (a) SEL did not influence the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects, in taking into account the opinion of their partners of the allocation on reward.
- (b) EA did not influence the subjects, in taking into account the opinion of their partners on the allocation of reward.
- (c) AX did not influence the subjects, in taking into account the opinion of their partners on the allocation of reward, ($F = 2.33, p < .05$).
- (d) The interaction effect of AXB, AXC, BXC and AXBXC did not influence the subjects, in taking into account the opinion of their partners on the allocation of reward.

When the effect of the level of emotional adjustment was differentiated it was found that on three times, of the 5-item questionnaire, low emotional adjustment was found to be statistically significant in influencing the reward allocation behaviour of the subjects in this study.

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S U G G E S T I O N S

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The present investigator feels that there is more scope for the study of this particular problem, specially in the Indian cultural, social and political context and offers the following suggestions:

1. There is need for field studies on this problem than experimental ones.
2. As most of the studies have been conducted on college or preschool and school subjects, we may find more interesting results if we study a different kind of sample.
3. In this type of study, the subjects of both the sexes should be taken as the investigator feels that males would have differed. It is known that boys and girls differ in their expectations and reactions due to cultural conditioning.

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R E F E R E N C E S

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APPENDICES

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सामाजिक एवं आर्थिक स्तर की जाँच

नाम- आयु वर्ष तारीख
स्कूल/कॉलेज का नाम व पता- कक्षा-
घर का पूरा पता-

निर्देश : यह प्रश्नावली बयस्क (Adults) तथा विद्यार्थियों दोनों के लिए है। अगर आप बयस्क या परिवार के मुखिया हैं तो नीचे लिखे प्रश्नों के उत्तर साधानी से दें। अगर आप स्कूल या कॉलेज के विद्यार्थी हैं तो आप प्रश्नों के उत्तर अपने पिता या संरक्षक (Guardian) के बारे में जहाँ तक हो सके सही-सही और साधानी से दें।

हरेक प्रश्नों के गई सम्भावित उत्तर दिये हुए हैं। आपको इन अनेक उत्तरों में से केवल एक उत्तर को चुनकर उसके सामने दिए हुए खाने में सही का (box) निशान लगाना है। ध्यान रहे, आपको इस प्रकार हरेक प्रश्न का सिर्फ एक उत्तर देना है। केवल प्रश्न संख्या में यह नियम नहीं लागू होगा जिसके लिए उक्त प्रश्न के सामने अलग से निर्देश दिया गया है।

1- आपका किस तरह का व्यवसाय/पेशा है? (विद्यार्थी अपने पिता या संरक्षक के बारे में उत्तर दें)

अ- उच्च प्रशासनात्मक(गजटेड अधिकारी) , प्रबन्धात्मक या व्यावसायिक कार्य, बड़े वकील या डाक्टर का काम, उच्च शैक्षणिक(यूनिवर्सिटी प्रोफेसर) कार्य । ()

ब- मध्यवर्गीय शासनात्मक (नान गजटेड अधिकारी), व्यवसायिक प्रबन्धात्मक तथा टैक्नीकल कार्य, मध्यम श्रेणी के वकील या डाक्टर का काम, बड़े दुकानदार हाईस्कूल या इंटर कॉलेज के अध्यापक। ()

स- क्लर्क या दुकान-सहायक का काम, साधारण व्यावसायिक या साधारण टैक्नीकल कार्य अथवा अन्य कौशल का कार्य, प्राइमरी या मिडिल स्कूल के अध्यापक । ()

द- बहुत मामूली कौशल का कार्य, कृषि कार्य, सेवक या (सरकारी चपरासी या चतुर्थ श्रेणी की नौकरी । ()

क- श्रमिक कार्य, अन्य कोई शारीरिक काम। ()

2- आपने कहाँ तक शिक्षा प्राप्त की है? (विद्यार्थी अपने पिता या संरक्षक के बारे में उत्तर दें)

- अ- शोधकार्य या समकक्षीय शिक्षा (डाक्टरेट, आदि) ()
- आ- स्नातकोत्तर शिक्षा () ()
- इ- स्नातकीय शिक्षा () ()
- ई- इण्टरमीडिएट () ()
- उ- हाईस्कूल () ()
- ऊ- मिडिल स्कूल (आठवीं कक्षा तक)। ()
- ए- अल्प शिक्षित () ()
- ऐ- शिक्षा रहित (अनपढ़ या) ()

3- आपकी औसत आय (आयदनी) प्रति माह कितनी है?

(विद्यार्थी अपने पिता या संरक्षक की आय के बारे में उत्तर दें)

- अ- 150। ₹ से अधिक () ई- 20। ₹ से 400 ₹ तक ()
- आ- 100। ₹ से 1500 ₹ तक () उ- 5। ₹ से 200 ₹ तक ()
- इ- 40। ₹ से 1000 तक () ऊ- 50 ₹ से कम ()

4- आपका मकान कैसा है ?

अ- लान, बिजली और टेलीफोन सहित बड़ा बंगला या कई मंजिलों वाली इमारत ()

आ- छोटा बंगला, छोटा लान, बिजली आदि। ()

इ- पक्का मकान, बिजली आदि। ()

ई- कच्चा मकान, कच्चा-पक्का मिश्रित ()

उ- छोटा कच्चा मकान ()

5- आपके घर में नीचे लिखी हुई वस्तुओं में से जो-जो चीजें मौजूद हों उनके सामने

दिये हुए खानों () में निशान लगाइए -

अ- कार (), मोटर साइकिल या स्कूटर (), रिक्शा (),
सायकिल ()

आ- सोफा-सेट (), अच्छी कुर्सी और मेज (), काठ की कुर्सी ()

इ- रेडियो-ट्रांजिस्टर () रेडियों ()

ई- दीवाल घड़ी () , मेज घड़ी () , स्टिट वाच () ।

उ- रेफ्रिजरेटर () , सेफ () , आलमारी () ।

ऊ- इलेक्ट्रिक स्टोव () , बिजली का पंखा () , स्टोव () ।

6- आपके घर का अखबार, मैगजीन, पत्रिका, किताब आदि पर कितना लगभग खर्च होता है-

अ- दस रुपये प्रतिमाह से अधिक ()

आ- छः रुपये से दस रुपये तक ()

इ- चार रुपये से छः रुपये तक ()

ई- दो रुपये से चार रुपये के अन्दर ()

7- क्या आपके घर में प्रतिदिन अखबार लिया जाता है?

अ- हाँ () , आ- कभी-कभी () , इ- कभी नहीं ()

8- आपके लड़के/लड़की ने सबसे ऊँची शिक्षा कहाँ तक प्राप्त की है या कर रहे हैं?

(विद्यार्थी अपने माई/माइयों के बारे में उत्तर दें)

अ- स्नातकोत्तर या उससे अधिक () ()

आ- स्नातक () ()

इ- स्नातक () ()

ई- हाईस्कूल/मैट्रिक या हायर सेकेण्डरी ()

9- आपको लड़की/लड़कियों ने सबसे ऊँची शिक्षा कहाँ तक प्राप्त की है या कर रहे हैं?

(विद्यार्थी अपने बहन/बहिनो के बारे में उत्तर दें)

अ- स्नातक या उससे अधिक () ()

आ- इण्टरमीडिएट ()

इ- हाईस्कूल/मैट्रिक या हायर सेकेण्डरी ()

10- अपने जीवन में व्यक्तिगत होने के लिए आप कौन सा व्यवसाय पसन्द करते हैं या कौन से जीवन-व्यवसाय के लिए आपकी तीव्र इच्छा है? (इच्छित व्यवसाय के नीचे लाइन भी चींच दें)।

अ- इंजीनियर, डाक्टर, प्रोफेसर, आफिसर का कार्य ()

11- सामाजिक स्तर का विचार या निर्धारण निम्न में से किस आधार पर करना चाहिए?

अ- व्यवसाय तथा कार्य के अनुसार ()

आ- सम्पत्ति तथा आर्थिक दशा के अनुसार ()

इ- जाति के अनुसार ()

12- क्या जाति-प्रथा ठीक है?

अ- नहीं ()

आ- कहा नहीं जा सकता ()

इ- हाँ ()

निर्देश : यह रिसर्च एजुकेशन एण्ड वाकेशनल गाइडेन्स सेन्टर मुस्लिम विश्वविद्यालय अलीगढ़ की ओर से की जा रही है। इसका उद्देश्य विद्यार्थियों के व्यक्तित्व और उनकी समस्याओं (प्रोब्लम) का पता लगाना है। यदि आप अपने व्यक्तित्व को समझने के अधिक उत्सुक हों तो आगे के पृष्ठों पर दिए हुए प्रश्नों का उत्तर सोच समझकर एवं ईमानदारी से दीजिए जिससे आप अपने आपको भली भाँति समझ सकें।

उत्तर देते समय ध्यान रखिये कि आप किसी की सहायता अथवा राय न लें, नहीं तो जो फल तथा जानकारी प्राप्त होगी वह गलत होने का विचार नहीं किया गया है। प्रत्येक प्रश्न के सामने तीन खाने हैं - 'हाँ' या 'नहीं' और 'मालूम नहीं' के खाने पर केवल उस समय निशान लगाइये जब आपको पूर्ण विश्वास हो कि आप अपना उत्तर न तो 'हाँ' में दे सकते हैं और न 'नहीं' में। उत्तर देने के समय की कोई रोकटोक नहीं है, परन्तु यदि आप जवाब देने में अधिक देर न लगायें तो अच्छा है।

यदि आप अपने माता-पिता के साथ नहीं रह रहे हों तो ऐसी स्थिति में संबंधित प्रश्नों का उत्तर उन लोगों के ध्यान में रखकर दीजिए जिनके साथ-आप रहते आये हों-

प्रश्नावली

हाँ नहीं मालूम नहीं

- 1- क्या भीड़भाड़ से आप दूर ही रहना पसन्द करते हैं? () () ()
- 2- क्या आप अपने भविष्य के प्रति बहुधा पेशान रहते हैं?
- 3- क्या आपको जुकम(नज़ल) बहुधा हो जाया करता है? () () ()
- 4- क्या आप अपने माता-पिता के साथ आपका () () ()
संबंध साधारणतया अच्छा रहा है?
- 5- क्या आपको बहुधा ऋण लेने की आवश्यकता पड़ती है? () () ()
- 6- क्या आपको यह आभास है कि आपके माता-पिता
आपकी अपेक्षा आपके अन्य भाई-बहिनों से
अधिक प्रेम करते हैं? () () ()

- 7- क्या आप आसानी से झेंप जाया करते हैं? () () ()
- 8- क्या बिना किसी स्पष्ट कारण के आपका
हृदय कभी-कभी धड़कने लगता है? () () ()
- 9- क्या किसी कार्य को आप अकेले करने की अपेक्षा
दूसरे के साथ करना अधिक पसन्द करते हैं? () () ()
- 10- क्या आपके माता-पिता बिना किसी कारण
आप पर आलोचना करते हैं? () () ()
- 11- क्या आपके साथियों की यह शिकायत रहती
है कि आप उनसे कम मिलते-जुलते हैं? () () ()
- 12- क्या आप बहुधा कार्य आरम्भ करके अधूरा
छोड़ देते हैं? () () ()
- 13- क्या आपको ठीक तरह नींद न आने की
शिकायत रहती है? () () ()
- 14- क्या आपको अपने भाई-बहनों से अधिकतर
लड़ाई-झगड़ा रहता है? () () ()
- 15- क्या आपको किसी त्वचा रोग या त्वचा कटने
की शिकायत रहती है? () () ()
- 16- रेल या बस में यात्रा करते हुए क्या सहयात्रियों
को बातों में लगा लिया करते हैं? () () ()
- 17- क्या बहुधा आप किन्ताग्रस्त रहते हैं कि
आपकी आर्थिक स्थिति ठीक न होने के कारण
आपकी शिक्षा उतनी अच्छी नहीं हो रही
है जितनी आप इच्छा करते हैं? () () ()
- 18- क्या बिना कारण ही बहुधा आपके मूड
परिवर्तन होते रहते हैं? () () ()

- 19- क्या आपको यह आभास होता है कि आपके () () ()
माता-पिता आप पर इतना अधिकार रखेंगे
जुए हैं कि आपको साधारण से साधारण कार्य
भी उनके इच्छानुसार करना पड़ता है?
- 20- क्या आपको अधिकतर रयाह की शिकायत () () ()
रहती है ?
- 21- क्या आपको किसी कार्य के करने या न करने () () ()
का निर्णय करते समय साधारणतया संकोच
और कठिनाई होती है?
- 22- क्या आपके किसी ऐसे व्यक्ति से वार्तालाप () () ()
आरम्भ करने में कठिनाई होती है जिससे आपका
नया-नया परिचय हुआ हो?
- 23- क्या बुढ़ा आपकी यह इच्छा होती है कि () () ()
उन व्यक्तियों से घनिष्ठता बढ़ाएँ जिनकी
आर्थिक स्थिति बहुत अच्छी है?
- 24- क्या कुछ निंदों से आपका भार घट रहा है? () () ()
- 25- साधारणतया बहुत से व्यक्तियों के सामने () () ()
आपको व्यक्त करने में शब्दों के चयन में आपको
कठिनाई होती है?
- 26- क्या आपको बहुधा अपनी विवशता एवं निरसहाय () () ()
हाने का आभास होता है?
- 27- क्या कभी ऐसा हुआ है कि किसी निम्न संबंधी () () ()
की सज्जता तथा मृत्यु ने आपको दुःखी बना
दिया हो?

- 28- क्या आपको माता-पिता का यह विचार है कि () () ()
आप धन व्यर्थ व्यय करते हैं?
- 29- किसी सार्वजनिक सभा में जब सब लोग आसन ग्रहण
कर चुके हों क्या सभा में प्रवेश करते समय आपको () () ()
संकोच होता है ?
- 30- क्या अपने कार्य तथा निर्णयों पर आपको पश्चात्ताप
होता है? () () ()
- 31- बहुत देर तक बैठे रहने के उपरान्त () () ()
जब आप उठते हैं तो क्या आपकी
आखों के सामने अंधेरा छा जाता है?
- 32- क्या अपने घर में पवित्र प्रेम और स्नेह की कमी
का आभास करते हैं? () () ()
- 33- क्या बहुधा आप मलिन चित रहते हैं? () () ()
- 34- क्या अपने विचारों में इस प्रकार निमग्न हो () () ()
जाते हैं कि अपने वातावरण के प्रति जागरूक नहीं
रह पाते?
- 35- क्या अपनी कक्षा के सामने कोई मौलिक () () ()
वक्तव्य करना आपके लिए कठिन
होता है?
- 36- क्या आपका विचार है कि आपके माता तथा () () ()
पिता ने आपके साथ आवश्यकता से अधिक
कठोरता का व्यवहार किया है?

- 37- क्या आपको कभी हृदय, फेफड़े, जिगर अथवा गुर्दे का कोई रोग रहा है? () () ()
- 38- क्या दूसरों से प्रतियोगिता के विचार से आपको घबराहट होती है? () () ()
- 39- क्या आपकी यह भावना रहती है कि आर्थिक कठिनाइयों के कारण आपको बहुधा ऐसे कार्य करने पड़ते हैं जो आपके स्वाभिमान के विरुद्ध है? () () ()
- 40- क्या आपके विचार में एक मनुष्य में जो गुण होने चाहिए वह आपके पिता जी में है? () () ()
- 41- क्या आप सहज भाव से मित्र बना लेते हैं? () () ()
- 42- क्या कभी-कभी आपके सिर में अत्यधिक कष्ट दायक पीड़ा होती है? () () ()
- 43- क्या आपको बहुधा इस बात की खिन्नता होती है कि आपके माता-पिता तथा घर वाले शिक्षित एवं विचारशील नहीं हैं? () () ()
- 44- क्या आप समारोहों के अवसर पर साधारणतया पीछे-पीछे रहते हैं? () () ()
- 45- क्या किसी उच्च स्थान पर पहुँचकर भय होता है कि आप नीचे गिर पड़ेंगे? () () ()
- 46- क्या आपके माता-पिता में कोई छोटी-छोटी बातों पर बिगड़ जाते हैं? () () ()

- 47- क्या बहुधा आपको यह आभास होता है कि () () ()
आपने कोई अभियोग तथा पाप किया है?
- 48- क्या (पुस्म) से आप सुविधापूर्वक भैत्री () () ()
स्थापित कर लेते हैं?
- 49- क्या किंचितमात्र क्रम करने पर आपकी आँखों () () ()
पर जोर पड़ने लगता है?
- 50- क्या आप आलोचना तथा विरोध से () () ()
अत्याधिक मलिन चित और व्याकुल हो
जाते हैं?
- 51- क्या बहुधा रुपये के आभास के कारण () () ()
आपकी अपनी दृष्टियों और मनोरंजन के
कार्यक्रम की स्थिति करना पड़ता है?
- 52- क्या अन्य व्यक्तियों के माता-पिता को देखकर () () ()
आपको कभी यह विचार होता है कि आपके
माता-पिता इतने अछे नहीं हैं?
- 53- क्या आपके स्वास्थ्य को हानि पहुँचाने के भय से () () ()
आपको बहुधा खाने में सावधानी करनी
पड़ती है?
- 54- क्या आप रीति-रिवाज के बन्धन को जीवन के () () ()
लिए महत्वपूर्ण और आवश्यक समझते हैं?
- 55- क्या आपके बहुधा कब्ज रहता है? () () ()
- 56- क्या बिना आपके किसी दोष के आपके लिए () () ()
दूषित वातावरण उत्पन्न हो जाता है?
- 57- क्या लज्जाशिल होने के कारण आपका मन () () ()
विचलित रहता है?

- 58- क्या आपकी धारणा है कि आपके मित्रों का () () ()
घरेलू जीवन आपके जीवन से अधिक सुखदायक
है?
- 59- क्या प्रातः काल से कर उठने के उपरान्त भी () () ()
आप अपने शरीरमें थकवट पाते हैं?
- 60- जिस कमरे में बहुत से व्यक्ति बैठे बातें कर () () ()
रहे हों क्या उसमें प्रवेश करते हुए आप को
संकोच होता है?
- 61- क्या आपके मन में ऐसे विचार उठते रहते हैं () () ()
जिसके कारण आप सो नहीं पाते?
- 62- क्या अधिकांश मामलों में अपने माता-पिता () () ()
से आप भिन्न विचार रखते हैं?
- 63- क्या अपने से अधिक धन-सम्पन्न व्यक्तियों को () () ()
देखकर आपको मन खिन्न हो उठता है कि
आपकी आर्थिक स्थिति उनके समान नहीं है?
- 64- क्या आप साधारण समारोहों के अवसर पर () () ()
कर्ता-धर्ती बन जाते हैं?
- 65- क्या आपको कभी यह आभास होता है कि () () ()
पिता अथवा माता ने आपको नहीं समझा?
- 66- क्या छान होने के कारण आप बहुधा कक्षा () () ()
में अनुपस्थित रहते हैं?
- 67- क्या आपको यह विचार व्याकुल करता है कि () () ()
अन्य व्यक्ति आपके भावों को ताड़ रहे हैं?
- 68- क्या किसी अपरिचित से वार्तालाप आरम्भ () () ()
करने में आपको कठिनाई होती है?
- 69- क्या किसी साधारण तिरस्कार के व्यवहार से () () ()
आप किसी समय तक व्याकुल रहते हैं?
- 70- क्या थोड़े से श्रम के बाद थकान होने () () ()
लगती है?

- 71- क्या आपके विचार है कि आपके अत्यधिक समय धन प्राप्ति के प्रयत्न या आर्थिक कठिनाइयों को दूर करने में लगता है? (X) () ()
- 72- आपके विचार में एक स्नेही माता को जैसा होना चाहिए उस कसौटी पर आपकी माता पूरी उतरती हैं या नहीं? () () ()
- 73- लोगों के सम्मक्ष किसी विषय पर वाद-विवाद आरम्भ करने के लिए या कोई विचार व्यक्त करते हुए आप शिक्षक का आभास करते हैं? 1 () () ()
- 74- क्या आपके बहुधा चक्कर आते रहते हैं? () () ()
- 75- क्या आप अपनी आकृति या बाह्य रूप के कारण अपने संबंध में सोचते हैं? () () ()
- 76- क्या आपके माता-पिता में कुछ ऐसी आदतें हैं जो आपके लिए कष्टदायक हैं? () () ()
- 77- क्या अपनी आर्थिक स्थिति को ठीक करने के हेतु आपके मन चाहता है कि लाटरी एवं प्रश्नावली भरने में भाग लें? () () ()
- 78- क्या अपनी कक्षा के सम्मक्ष कुछ पढ़ने के लिए आते हुए शिक्षक का आभास करते हैं? () () ()
- 79- क्या आपके माता-पिता अपनी हर बात (वह उचित हो या अनुचित) मनवाने के लिए आपको विवश करते हैं? () () ()
- 80- क्या बहुधा आपके उपचार आदि करने की आवश्यकता होती है? () () ()
- 81- क्या आपको कभी-कभी यह आभास होता है कि कोई भयानक घटना घटित होने वाली है? () () ()
- 82- क्या रास्ता चलते हुए आपके आभास होता है कि लोग आपको घूर रहे हैं? () () ()

- 83- क्या आपके घर वालों से तथा निकट संबंधियों से बहुत कलह होती रहती है? () () ()
- 84- क्या अपनी आर्थिक स्थिति पर विचार करके आपको मन इस बात पर खिन्न होता है कि भाग्य अथवा समाज ने आपके साथ न्याय नहीं किया? () () ()
- 85- क्या लोगों के समूह में विदा लेते समय आपको उनसे आज्ञा लेने में शिश्न होती है? () () ()
- 86- क्या साधारण बातों पर आपको शीघ्र ही क्रोध होता है आप झल्लम उठते हैं? () () ()
- 87- क्या आत्म शान्ति के लिए आपको चुप रहना या घर से बाहर चलना पड़ता है? () () ()
- 88- क्या बहुत आपकी गर्दन, सीना या पीठ में दर्द होने की शिकयत हो जाती है? () () ()
- 89- क्या प्रश्नों का उत्तर जानते हुए भी आप कक्षा के समय इस कारण उत्तर नहीं दे पाते कि दूसरों के सामने बोलते हुए आपको संकोच होता है? () () ()
- 90- क्या बहुत आपकी कै, मतली और दस्त की शिकयत हो जाती है? () () ()

Appendix III

SINHA ANXIETY SCALE

(Sinha W.A. Self-Analysis Form)

निर्देशन

अगले पृष्ठों पर आपको सामाजिक और व्यावहारिक समस्याओं से सम्बन्धित कुछ वाक्य दिये हुए हैं। इन वाक्यों में उन्हीं बातों को उल्लेख है जो आप अपने दैनिक जीवन में अनुभव करते हैं और व्यवहार में लाते हैं। इन वाक्यों का सम्बन्ध आपको बुद्धि परीक्षा से नहीं बल्कि कुछ तथ्यों की जाँच से है।

सूची में दी हुई प्रत्येक समस्या को ध्यान से पढ़िए। प्रत्येक समस्या के सामने "हाँ" या "नहीं" लिखा हुआ है। आपके व्यवहार व परिस्थिति में जो समस्या सत्य या असत्य हो उनमें से प्रत्येक के सामने "हाँ" या "नहीं" पर निशान (✓) लगाइये। जैसे- मुझे अपने ऊपर बिल्कुल विश्वास नहीं है" यदि यह वाक्य आपके व्यवहार में सत्य है तो "हाँ" के सामने निशान (✓) लगाएँ और यदि असत्य है तो "नहीं" के सामने निशान लगाएँ।

सूची भरने के लिए आपको पूरी स्वतंत्रता है। आपके उत्तर पूर्ण रूप से गोपनीय रहे जायेंगे। प्रत्येक समस्या को पढ़िए और उसके सामने विचार के अनुसार निशान लगाइए।

सभी समस्याओं पर निशान लगाना आवश्यक है। कृपया शीघ्रता से उत्तर दें।

उत्तर शीघ्र दीजिए

प्रत्येक समस्या का उत्तर देना आवश्यक है

क्रम संख्या

निशान (✓) लगाइए

१- मुझे तेज सवारी पर चलने से घबराहट होती है।

(हाँ) (नहीं)

२- मैं थोड़ी सी नी आवाज से घबड़ा जाता हूँ।

हाँ नहीं

३- विपरीत लिंग के व्यक्ति ()
से मिलने पर मुझे कुछ घबड़ाहट सी मालूम होती है।

हाँ नहीं

४- घर के बाहर जाने पर कभी-कभी सन्देह होता है कि मैंने बक्स या दरवाजा बन्द किया या नहीं।

हाँ नहीं

५- मैं अधिकतर यह सोचकर परेशान रहता हूँ कि कहौलोग मेरा मज़ाक न उड़ाएँ।

हाँ नहीं

६- कभी कभी मुझे सन्देह होता है कि मेरे मित्र मेरी गुप्त बातों को प्रकट न कर दें।

हाँ नहीं

७- प्रायः मुझमें अपराध की भावना होती है।

हाँ नहीं

८- कभी कभी मैं नाखून कुतरता हूँ।

हाँ नहीं

- ६- मुझे प्रायः एक डर बना रहता है कि कहीं कोई आपत्ति या दुर्भाग्य न टूट पड़े । हाँ नहीं
- १०- ठंडक के दिनों में मुझे बड़ी आसानी से पसीना आ जाता है। हाँ नहीं
- ११- मुझे प्रायः बुरे और डरावने सपने दिखाई देते हैं। हाँ नहीं
- १२- मुझे कभी कभी यह चिन्ता हो जाती है कि कहीं मैं नपुंसक न हो जाऊँ । हाँ नहीं
- १३- कभी कभी इस विचार से मैं परेशान हो जाता हूँ कि अपने काम में अधिक प्रगति नहीं कर पाऊँगा । हाँ नहीं
- १४- अपनी आलोचना सुनकर मैं बहुत घबड़ा जाता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- १५- कभी कभी अपने ऊपर इतनी आत्म-ग्लानि होती है कि मन करता है कि समाज से कहीं दूर भाग जाऊँ । हाँ नहीं
- १६- यदि कोई मेरी गलतियों दूसरों के सामने कहता है तो मैं विचलित सा हो जाता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- १७- बीमारी के कीटाणुओं के नय से मैं शायद ही कभी घर के बाहर पानी पीता हूँ। हाँ नहीं

१८- कभी कभी मैं अकारण ही दुःखी हो जाता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
१९- मुझे अधिकतर ऐसा लगता है कि दूसरे लोग मेरी उपेक्षा कर रहे हैं।	हाँ	नहीं
२०- मैं बड़ी आसानी से धर्म संकट में पड़ जाता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
२१- किसी एक कार्य पर ध्यान केन्द्रित करना मेरे लिए प्रायः मुश्किल हो जाता है।	हाँ	नहीं
२२- अबसर मेरा जी मचलाता है।	हाँ	नहीं
२३- काम करते समय मेरे हाथ काँपते हैं।	हाँ	नहीं
२४- मुझे कभी कभी मय हो जाता है कि नए कपड़े पहन कर मैं बेढंगा न लगूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
२५- मुझे यह जानकारी परेशानी होती है कि मेरा मुँह शर्म से लाल होने जा रहा है।	हाँ	नहीं
२६- मुझे अधिकतर ऐसा लगता है कि मेरा दिल जोर से धड़क रहा है।	हाँ	नहीं
२७- मुझे दूसरों की अपेक्षा अधिक घबड़ाहट होती है।	हाँ	नहीं
२८- मुझे अबसर रोने की इच्छा होती है।	हाँ	नहीं

२६- कभी कभी चिन्ता के कारण मुझे नींद नहीं आती ।	हाँ	नहीं
३०- मुझे अपने से बड़े (निर्देशक, अव्यापक, अधोदाक) से मिलने में परेशानी होती है।	हाँ	नहीं
३१- कभी कभी मैं बहुत बैचन हो उठता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
३२- दूसरों की गलतियों पर भी मैं शर्मिन्दा हो जाता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
३३- जल्दी काम करने से मेरा दम फूलने लगता है।	हाँ	नहीं
३४- मैं अपना काम काफी मानसिक तनाव की हालत में करता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
३५- अबसर मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि मुझे कोई नहीं चाहता ।	हाँ	नहीं
३६- मेरे सामने कोई कठिन काम आने पर मैं काँपने लगता हूँ या मुझे पसीना आने लगता है।	हाँ	नहीं
३७- कभी कभी मैं सपने देखता हूँ कि बुरी तरह बीमार हो गया हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
३८- कभी कभी मैं ऐसे सपने देखता हूँ जो दूसरों से कहने लायक नहीं होते ।	हाँ	नहीं

३६-	किसी चीज़ के लिए प्रतीक्षा करना मेरे लिए एक परेशानी हो जाती है।	हाँ	नहीं
४०-	मेरी भावनाओं को बढ़ी जल्दी ठेस लग जाती है।	हाँ	नहीं
४१-	मैं हमेशा किसी न किसी चीज़ के लिए परेशान रहता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
४२-	मैं हरदम फट की गड़बड़ी से परेशान रहता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
४३-	किसी भी प्रकार के निश्चय पर पहुँचने में मुझे बहुत कठिनाई होती है।	हाँ	नहीं
४४-	मैं कभी कभी व्यर्थ की बातों के लिए भी चिन्तित हो जाता हूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
४५-	मैं अधिकतर डरा करता हूँ कि कहीं मैं अपने मित्रों को न खो बैटूँ।	हाँ	नहीं
४६-	कभी कभी मैं क्षुब्ध उत्तेजित हो जाता हूँ कि साफ साफ बोल नहीं पाता ।	हाँ	नहीं
४७-	मुझे अन्य लोगों की अपेक्षा अधिक आत्म-संकोच () होता है।	हाँ	नहीं
४८-	मुझे जीवन अधिकतर एक भार सा लगता है।	हाँ	नहीं

- ४६- मुझे अपने ऊपर बिलकुल विश्वास नहीं है। हाँ नहीं
- ५०- कभी कभी मेरे लिए मानसिक स्थिरता बनार रखना कठिन हो जाता है। हाँ नहीं
- ५१- जब बुरे सपने के कारण मेरी नींद टूट जाती है तो मेरे लिए फिर सोना मुश्किल हो जाता है। हाँ नहीं
- ५२- कभी कभी मुझे छोटी छोटी बातों पर भी लज्जा और शर्म होता है। हाँ नहीं
- ५३- जब मुझे किसी अनजान व्यक्ति से मिलना हो तो मुझे घबड़ाहट होती है। हाँ नहीं
- ५४- मेरी नींद रात में कई बार टूट जाती है। हाँ नहीं
- ५५- कभी कभी मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि मैं समाज को सुँह दिखलाने लायक नहीं हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ५६- जब दो या अधिक कानाफूसी करते हैं तो मुझे लगता है कि वे मेरे हों बारे में बात कर रहे हैं। हाँ नहीं
- ५७- यदि मुझसे कोई अनुचित सामाजिक व्यवहार हो जाता है तो मैं उसे भूल नहीं पाता। हाँ नहीं

- ५८- जीवन की बीती घटनाओं को सोचकर
मुझे कुछ ज़ोम सा होता है। हाँ नहीं
- ५९- कभी कभी मैं यह सोचकर परेशान हो जाता
हूँ कि बूढ़े होने पर मेरे बच्चे मेरा आदर
नहीं करेंगे। हाँ नहीं
- ६०- यात्रा शुरू करने से पहले मैं कुछ चिन्तित
हो जाता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ६१- मैं ऐसी परिस्थितियों में पड़ना पसन्द
नहीं करता जिनमें निर्णय शीघ्र करना
पड़ता है। हाँ नहीं
- ६२- मुझे बक्सर यह चिन्ता बनी रहती है कि
मैं देखने में सुन्दर नहीं हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ६३- कभी कभी मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि मैं
शीघ्र बूढ़ा होने लगा। हाँ नहीं
- ६४- यदि मुझे डाक्टर या सर्जन के पास दिखलाने
के लिए जाना होता है तो मुझे घबड़ाहट
होती है। हाँ नहीं
- ६५- कभी कभी मुझे शंका हो जाती है कि मेरे
मित्र मुझे धोखा न दें। हाँ नहीं
- ६६- जब मैं कोई नया काम करता हूँ तो मुझे
परेशानी रहती है कि दूसरे समर्थन करेंगे
या नहीं। हाँ नहीं

- ६७- मैं अपने स्वास्थ्य के विषय में अधिकतर
चिन्तित रहा करता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ६८- लोगों के बीच भी मैं अधिकतर अकेला
महसूस करता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ६९- जब मैं किसी व्यक्ति को प्रतीक्षा करता
हूँ जिसने किसी निश्चित समय पर आने को
कहा है तो मुझे अक्सर ऐसा लगता है कि
शायद वह नहीं आयेगा। हाँ नहीं
- ७०- कभी कभी मैं कुछ ऐसे कामों से परेशान हो
जाता हूँ जिनको मैं स्पष्ट रूप से जानता
नहीं। हाँ नहीं
- ७१- बहुत बार ऐसा होता है कि मैं साफ साफ
नहीं सोच सकता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ७२- बहुधा मैं यह निश्चित नहीं कर पाता हूँ कि
किस तरह से काम करना मेरे लिए अच्छा
होगा। हाँ नहीं
- ७३- मैं बहुधा अपने बारे में अनिश्चित रहता
हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ७४- कभी कभी मैं ऐसा सोच बैठता हूँ कि मैं
किसी काम का नहीं हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ७५- मुझे अधिकतर ऐसा लगता है कि यह संसार
तथा मनुष्य दोनों ही व्यर्थ हैं। हाँ नहीं

७६- अरुफल होने के मय से मुझे किसी काम को शुरू करने में हिचकिचाहट होती है।	हां	नहीं
७७- सपनों में कभी कभी मैं अपने निकट और प्रिय सम्बन्धियों की मृत्यु देखता हूँ।	हां	नहीं
७८- मैं शीघ्र ही थक जाता हूँ।	हां	नहीं
७९- मेरी हथेली में अक्सर पसीना आता है।	हां	नहीं
८०- इस डर से कि कहीं लोग मेरा मज़ाक न उड़ाए, मैं लोगों के सम्मुख बातचीत करना पसन्द नहीं करता ।	हां	नहीं
८१- मुझे अक्सर ऐसा लगता है कि मेरे ऊपर कोई आपत्ति आने वाली है।	हां	नहीं
८२- कभी कभी मुझे ऐसा लगता है कि मुझे लोग पसन्द नहीं करते हैं।	हां	नहीं
८३- मैं अक्सर चिंतित रहता हूँ कि मेरे भाग्य में क्या लिखा है।	हां	नहीं
८४- दूसरों के किर पर मुझे ही प्रायः दोषी ठहराया जाता है।	हां	नहीं
८५- मैं अक्सर छोटी छोटी चीजों के लिए भी परेशान रहता हूँ।	हां	नहीं
८६- मैं यह सोचकर कि शायद अपना वायदा पूरा न कर पाऊँ अक्सर परेशान हो जाता हूँ।	हां	नहीं

- ८७- कठिन परिस्थितियों में मैं बहुत उत्तेजित हो उठता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ८८- मुझे करीब करीब हर समय भूख सी लगती है। हाँ नहीं
- ८९- मैं अक्सर चिंतित रहता हूँ कि भविष्य में शायद किसी संकट में न पड़ जाऊँ। हाँ नहीं
- ९०- यह चिन्ता मुझे परेशान करती है कि जब मैं बूढ़ा हो जाऊँगा तो मेरा स्वास्थ्य खराब न हो जाए। हाँ नहीं
- ९१- परिवार में दुर्घटना और मौत की संभावना सोचकर मैं परेशान हो जाता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ९२- मुझे इस बात की अक्सर चिन्ता रहती है कि मैं अपने काम से निकाल न दिया जाऊँ। हाँ नहीं
- ९३- कभी कभी मैं स्वयं उत्तेजित हो उठता हूँ कि मेरे लिए सोना कठिन हो जाता है। हाँ नहीं
- ९४- यह सोचकर मुझे चिन्ता हो जाती है कि एक दिन मैं भी बूढ़ा हो जाऊँगा। हाँ नहीं
- ९५- मैं अपनी बेटी शायद ही कभी छिपा पाता हूँ। हाँ नहीं
- ९६- मैं विपरीत लिंग (के लोगों से बात करते समय कुछ हकलाने सा लगता हूँ। हाँ नहीं

- ६७- मुझे कमी मुझे ऐसा शक होने लगता है कि मेरे मित्र मेरे बूढ़े होने पर मेरी इज्जत नहीं करेंगे । हाँ नहीं
- ६८- बुढ़ापे में शारीरिक शक्ति के क्षीण होने की संभावना मुझे सताया करती है। हाँ नहीं
- ६९- कमी कमीमें यह सोचकर परेशान हो जाता हूँ कि क्रोध में मैं किसी की हत्या न कर दूँ या भारी नुकसान न पहुँचा दूँ। हाँ नहीं
- १००- इस बात को मुझे अधिकतर चिन्ता रहती है कि मेरे मरने के बाद मेरे परिवार की क्या दशा होगी । हाँ नहीं

APPENDIX IV

Write down the contributions made by your partners and yourself:

A =

B =

C =


Together the three of you have earned Rs.6/- as monetary reward for the work you have done. Below are given 21 possible divisions of the group earnings (Rs.6/-). Read through them carefully and tick mark (✓) the division of money you think most appropriate for the contributions or inputs that you and your partners have made.

TO ME (With 80% input)	TO MY PARTNER (With 50% input)	TO MY PARTNER (With 30% input)
Rs. 6.00p	Rs. 0.00p	Rs. 0.00p ()
Rs. 5.25p	Rs. 0.50p.	Rs. 0.25p ()
Rs. 4.75p	Rs. 0.75p	Rs. 0.50p ()
Rs. 4.00p	Rs. 1.25p	Rs. 0.75p ()
Rs. 3.25p	Rs. 1.75p	Rs. 1.00p ()
Rs. 2.40p	Rs. 2.10p	Rs. 1.50p ()
Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p ()
TO MY PARTNER (With 80% input)	TO ME (With 50% input)	TO MY PARTNER (With 30% input)
Rs. 0.00p	Rs. 6.00p	Rs. 0.00p ()
Rs. 0.25p	Rs. 5.25p	Rs. 0.50p ()
Rs. 0.50p	Rs. 4.75p	Rs. 0.75p ()
Rs. 0.75p	Rs. 4.00p	Rs. 1.25p ()
Rs. 1.00p	Rs. 3.25p	Rs. 1.75p ()
Rs. 1.50p	Rs. 2.40p	Rs. 2.10p ()
Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p ()
TO MY PARTNER (With 80% input)	TO MY PARTNER (With 50% input)	TO ME (With 30% input)
Rs. 0.00p	Rs. 0.00p	Rs. 6.00p ()
Rs. 0.50p	Rs. 0.25p	Rs. 5.25p ()
Rs. 0.75p	Rs. 0.50p	Rs. 4.75p ()
Rs. 1.25p	Rs. 0.75p	Rs. 4.00p ()
Rs. 1.75p	Rs. 1.00p	Rs. 3.25p ()
Rs. 2.10p	Rs. 1.50p	Rs. 2.40p ()
Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p	Rs. 2.00p ()


APPENDIX - V

Answer the following five questions, keeping in mind your performance and your partner's performance. There are seven alternative answer, tick the one you think answers the question best:


(1) Did you take account of performance when dividing the rewards?




(2) How did your performance compare to that of your partners ?



(3) Was quality of your work similar to that of your partners ?



(4) Would you like to have the same partners in a further study ?



(5) Did you consider the effect of your division of the reward on your partner's opinion of you ?

